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Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's
Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice
and Mainstream Values
David H. Getchest
The Supreme Court has made radical departures from the
established principles of Indian law. The Court ignores precedent, construing statutes, treaties, and the Constitution liberally to reach results that comport with a majority of the Justices' attitudes about federalism, minority rights, and
protection of mainstream values. In the process, perhaps unintentionally, the Court is remaking Indian law and revising a
political relationship between the nation and Indian tribes that
was forged by the Framers of the Constitution and perpetuated
by every Supreme Court until now.
The Rehnquist Court seems oblivious to the discrete body
of Indian law that is based on solid judicial traditions tracing
back to the nation's founding. Until the mid-1980s, the Court's
approach in Indian law was to construe laws in light of the nation's tradition of recognizing independent tribal powers to govern their territory and the people within it. In interpreting
ambiguous treaties and laws, the Court regularly employed
canons of construction to give the benefit of doubt to Indians,
and it deferred to the political branches whenever congrestRaphael J. Moses Professor of Natural Resources Law, University of
Colorado School of Law. I benefited from insightful comments and suggestions
from Philip P. Frickey, Sarah Krakoff, Philip Weiser, and Robert A. Williams,
Jr., and received valuable comments on earlier versions of this Article from
participants in faculty colloquia held at the University of Washington School
of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, and University of Colorado
School of Law. I am grateful to University of Colorado law students Laura
Donson, McCrystie Adams, Christopher Hudson, Niccole Sacco, and Nina
Seevers for their fine research assistance, and Stuart Corbridge for his careful
statistical analysis and preparation of tables. Finally, I thank Dean Harold
Bruff for support made available through the University of Colorado faculty
summer research grants program.
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sional policy was not clear.' Now, these legal traditions are being almost totally disregarded. As I have argued elsewhere, the
Court is following a subjectivist approach in Indian law, a mission that has been characterized by Justice Scalia as determining "what the current state of affairs ought to be."'
Knowing that the Court is on a subjectivist path, however,
does not tell us where Indian law may be headed. Thus, the
purpose of this Article is to look beyond Indian law to search for
and test trends and directions evinced by the Court's decisions
in other fields and assess whether they offer guidance on the
future of Indian law. Scholarly commentary on the Court is often preoccupied with attempts to cabin the Justices' work according to popular conceptions of "conservative" or "liberal" political positions.3 Other scholars strive to categorize judicial
approaches according to various interpretive theories.' Much of
this work is unhelpful, limited as it is to established taxonomies.
The most informative studies examine the results of the
Court's decisions to identify attitudes that they reflect.' A review of the Court's activity during the Rehnquist era, from the
mid-1980s through the October 2000 Term, and most of the
scholarly commentary on the Court for that period suggest
some conclusions about the way the Court will resolve the
kinds of issues that will arise in future Indian cases. Several
studies reveal strong statistical evidence of trends in outcomes-who wins and who loses. In addition, subjective commentary identifies interests, values, and parties the Court favors or disfavors. This commentary is corroborated by the
statistical record.
Three remarkably consistent trends can be derived from
these studies: Virtually without exception, state interests prevail; attempts to protect specific rights of racial minorities fail;
and mainstream values are protected. Moreover, these domi1.

See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 222, 241-42

(Rennard Strickland ed., 1982); CHARLEs F. WILKINSON, AMERIcAN INDIANs,
TIME, AND THE LAW 46-52 (1987).
2. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1575

(1996) (quoting a memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William
Brennan, Jr. (April 4, 1990) (Duro v. Reina, U.S. Supreme Court No. 88-6546))
(emphasis added) (on file with the author).
3. See infra Part VI.A.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See infra Part VII.
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nant trends are manifested in Indian law because nearly every
Indian law case directly implicates one or more of the values
that underlie the trends. Thus, I conclude that these trends
correlate with and explain recent decisions in Indian law. They
also reflect attitudes that may dominate the course of Indian
law unless members of the Court revive the understanding and
appreciation of the distinct traditions of the field that their
predecessors honored for two centuries. Absent a judicial rediscovery of Indian law, Congress will have to legislate to correct the Court's misadventures.
I. PRE-REHNQUIST COURT INDIAN LAW:
ADHERENCE TO FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS; ORIGINAL
INTENT; DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS
The fundamental tenets of Indian law are built on early
nineteenth century precedents. Three key decisions by Chief
Justice John Marshall,6 the "Marshall trilogy," form the foundation of Indian law. Supreme Court decisions in the field were
rare for the first hundred years, but when confronted with an
Indian case, the Court generally held true to foundational concepts. These concepts have constitutional roots, tracing to a bilateral relationship between tribes and the United States that
was deliberately and exclusively made the business of the political branches of the federal government.
The place of tribes in the federal system was a high profile
issue for the Framers. The Commerce Clause, cryptic though it
may appear, was adopted to acknowledge unequivocally the
sovereignty of tribes, to allocate legislative power over them,
and to impose commensurate limits on the states. In Worcester
v. Georgia, Marshall traced the origins of the clause, from the
colonies' motives for including a provision dealing with Indians
in the Articles of Confederation to the later embodiment of congressional power over Indian affairs in the Commerce Clause.'
The Articles said that the Continental Congress "shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power of... regulating the trade
and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any
of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State,

6. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823).
7. 31 U.S. at 558-59.
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within its own limits, be not infringed or violated."' Some
states, including Georgia, chose to read ambiguities in the provision as drafted to allow states to legislate in Indian affairs.
The Constitutional Convention gave considerable attention to
the resulting issues, and by 1787 the prevailing sentiment apparently supported centralized, rather than state, control over
Indian affairs and the legal autonomy of tribes.' Marshall
wrote in Worcester that the colonies wanted a single congress
that was vested with certain powers such as making war and
peace. "From the same necessity, and on the same principles,
congress assumed the management of Indian affairs.
Thus, in drafting the Commerce Clause, the Framers intended to clarify a pre-constitutional relationship and to curtail
arguments that state legislation could deal with Indians who
were within a state, or that congressional legislation would infringe state legislative rights." They plainly intended to vest
all power over Indian affairs in Congress. By the time the revision was crystallized into a single sentence that included the
matters of interstate and international commerce, it had been
condensed to remove the reference to "managing all affairs with
the Indians,"" but the changes in language, aimed at solidifying federal power, made the clause no less comprehensive.
interpreter of the clause's
Marshall, an apt contemporaneouspowers
comprehend all that
meaning,"' concluded that "[t]hese

8. Articles of Confederation, article IX.
9. Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN.
L. REV. 1055, 1147 (1995).
10. 31 U.S. at 558.
11. Madison wrote that in the Constitution, Congress's power "is very
properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of Confederation,
which render the provision obscure and contradictory." He said that by trying
"to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in
the States" the Articles "endeavored to accomplish impossibilities." THE
FEDERALIST No. 42, at 275 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1937).
12. Articles of Confederation, article IX.
13. Marshall lived through and was personally aware of the debates of the
Framers. He was a delegate to the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1788
and participated in the debates that led to the state's ratification of the Constitution. See ALBERT J. BEvERIDGE, 1 THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 358-479
(1916). The Worcester decision was written during James Madison's lifetime
when mistaking, let alone distorting, the intent or meaning of the Constitution
would be highly unlikely. In an Indian decision dealing with the meaning of
the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to Marshall along
with Madison and Hamilton as "three influential Framers." Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 70 (1996); see also Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 313-14 (1973)
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is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians.""4 The fact that it spoke in terms of "commerce" was not
intended to confine Congress's power to trade matters. The debates leave no doubt about this. 5 Accordingly, Marshall found
that the preemptive force of the provision operated to displace
state legislation by exclusively empowering Congress to enact
Indian legislation and treaties dealing with diverse subjects. 6
The state laws in Worcester concerned jurisdiction over the
granting and denial of permission for non-Indian missionaries
to preach within the Cherokee Nation. Marshall said that
these laws "interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our Constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the
union." 7
As broad as the extension of congressional power over Indian affairs was intended to be, it was not the purpose of the
government, in claiming or exercising that power, to destroy
tribal sovereignty. Referring to a provision in the treaty with
the Cherokees, Marshall said, "To construe the expression
'managing all their affairs,' into a surrender of [tribal] selfgovernment, would be, we think, a perversion of their neces(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("This Court gives particular weight to pronouncements of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall upon the meaning of his contemporaries
in framing the Constitution."); Bruce E. Fein, OriginalIntent and the Constitution, 47 MD. L. REV. 196, 199-200 (1987) ("The opinions of Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, Marshall and Story are entitled to great weight in the original
intent debate.... [This] quintet is thus more likely than later generations to
have correctly discerned tacit or express political understandings regarding
the intended standard for constitutional interpretation."). On the value of
contemporaneous construction, see, for example, National Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 586-89 (1949), which relies upon
an opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall who "wrote from close personal
knowledge of the Founders and the foundation of our constitutional structure"
to find that the District of Columbia should not be regarded as a state for diversity purposes. Id. at 587.
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
15. Robert Clinton traces the drafting process and concludes that the
"simple reference to commerce with the Indians" proposed by committees
charged with the project by the convention was "obviously viewed as synonymous with regulating Indian affairs or 'affairs with the Indians.'" Clinton, supranote 9, at 1156.
16. See 31 U.S. at 538; see also United States v. Forty-three Gallons of
Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 198 (1876) (holding that Congress has the power to prohibit the sale of liquor in Indian country and on Indian lands ceded to the
United States).
17. 31 U.S. at 561.
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sary meaning."" Exclusive congressional power, and its preemptive force, was necessary to implement laws and treaties
created to protect tribal government within tribal territory. As
Marshall put it in describing the tribes' relation to the United
States, "This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of individuals
abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master."' 9
These unequivocal original understandings formed the basis of the Marshall trilogy. Though its Indian law decisions
were sporadic until the modern era, the Court, with few exceptions, kept faith with those early, foundational decisions.
During the "modern era," from the 1960s to the mid1980s,2 ° the Court's Indian law activity accelerated. The foundational cases of the Marshall trilogy, adapted only slightly to
reflect evolving national policy, were invoked in virtually every
case to support the Court's decisions.2 1 These modern era cases
were not simply reaffirmations of the law in various familiar
conflicts. Many arose in tough, modern contexts-high stakes
tests that pitted state jurisdiction against tribal control and
federal power. For instance, the Court found that the old cases
carried principles durable enough to uphold tribal taxes on nonIndian oil development on a reservation;2 2 to insulate a tribe
from a double jeopardy claim when it prosecuted a defendant
for the same offense as had the federal government; 3 to allow a
tribe to place more onerous membership requirements on the
children of female members who married outside the tribe than
on the children of male members who did so;24 to deny state jurisdiction to tax income earned by an Indian in a bank on the

18. Id. at 553-54.
19. Id. at 555.
20. Charles Wilkinson discussed the cases for the period beginning in
1959 in his 1987 book, calling this the "modem era." See WILKINSON, supra
note 1, at 1.
21. During the 1970s and 1980s, only three pre-Civil War cases were cited
more often by the Supreme Court than Worcester v.Georgia: United States v.
Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
125-26 (4th ed. 1998).
22. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982).
23. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1977).
24. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978).
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reservation; 2 and to allow a tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on its reservation to the exclusion of state regulation
At the dawn of the modem era, as it began to consider dozens of jurisdictional contests between tribes and states, the
Court forcefully recognized that "the basic policy of Worcester
has remained."2 Judicial analysis focused increasingly on preemption, however, as a result of the proliferation of statutes
and treaties dealing with Indian affairs. The Court repeatedly
applied an interlaced doctrine of tribal sovereignty and federal
preemption traceable to the Marshall trilogy: "[Ajbsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the
state action [in question] infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."28 The
Court's discussion of the applicable law in one of the leading
modem era cases began as follows:
The principles governing the resolution of this question are not new.
On the contrary, "[tihe policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." This policy was first articulated by this Court 141 years ago [by] Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall" [in] Worcester v. Georgia ....

Using the Marshall trilogy as its linchpin, the Court honored the tradition of upholding tribal self-governance unless
Congress had spoken to the contrary. Any contention that
Congress had so spoken, often in cases involving state attempts
to control non-Indian activity on a reservation, required that
the Court examine "the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed
from historical traditions of tribal independence.""0
II. THE REHNQUIST ERA: THE RISE OF SUBJECTIVISM
In a spate of cases beginning about the time Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the Court veered away from the
25. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
26. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983).
27. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959) (recognizing that over the
years, minor exceptions had been made: Indians had been allowed to sue in
state courts and states had been allowed to prosecute non-Indians for crimes
against non-Indian victims).
28. Id. at 220.
29. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168 (quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786,
789 (1945)).
30. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1980).
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foundations of Indian law2 The Court began to alter the constitutionally anchored status of tribes to fit the fact situations
of cases. It has not directly overruled precedent, but it has virtually ignored the Marshall trilogy, which had been the touchstone of nearly all Indian law cases since the first Supreme
Court. Since the 1992 Term, only two majority opinions of the
Supreme Court in Indian law have cited any of the Marshall
trilogy cases for support.2 Indeed, the Court has forsaken not
only those foundational cases, but it has ignored most of the intervening 150 years of decisions, including nearly all of its approximately eighty modern era decisions. Three cases that had
created apparently aberrant special rules concerning nonIndians-Oliphant,Colville, and Montana v. United States"have now emerged from the modern era decisions as the most
influential precedents for this Court.3 4 Even as the courts of
other countries began to incorporate principles of indigenous
law that had long-standing acceptance in the United States,
the Supreme Court began its retreat."
31. Getches, supra note 2, at 1595-1620.
32. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 194 (1993) (citing Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation,
508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832)). But see Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520,
531 n.5 (1998) (citing Worcester and Cherokee as standing for "old principles"
and remarking that the tribe's argument relying on those cases "ignores our
Indian country precedents").
33. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978) (holding that tribes lack inherent jurisdiction over reservation crimes by nonIndians); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980) (holding that the state can require a cigarette tax to be collected on reservation sales to non-Indians); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557-67 (1981) (holding that tribes have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian land only if certain tribal interests
are implicated). In their milieu, it was reasonable to view these cases as aberrations, establishing narrow exceptions in light of difficult facts in the lower
courts. Getches, supra note 2, at 1595-1613.
34. See Oliphant,435 U.S. 191; Colville, 447 U.S. 134; Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544; see also WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 4-5 & n.11. By no
means were all of the modern era cases favorable to Indians. With a few exceptions, however, the Court produced a fairly consistent and predictable pattern of decisionmaking during the modern era. Id. at 4-5. In them, the Court
honored the foundational principles of Indian law, deferring to Congress, and,
in the absence of congressional action, assuming the continuing power of tribal
self-government. Id.
35. E.g., Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (1992) (Australian High Court
reversing Australia's old approach of rejecting aboriginal title, citing Johnson
and Worcester); Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (Canadian Supreme
Court holding the government has a fiduciary duty with respect to Indian title,
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To be sure, these Rehnquist-era decisions departing from,
but not overruling, venerable principles have created a veneer
of confusion over a historically complex but consistent body of
law.2 6 Taken in historical context, however, the Court's misadventures in Indian law have been concentrated in a relatively
citing Johnson and Worcester); Sparrow v. Regina, [19901 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Canadian Supreme Court recognizing aboriginal title subject only to legislative
infringement for justifiable reasons, citing Johnson). See generally Ralph W.
Johnson, FragileGains: Two Centuries of Canadianand United States Policy
Toward Indians,66 WASH. L. REV. 643 (1991).
36. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit Divestiture
Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country,
36 TULSA L.J. 267, 267 (2000) ("[The Supreme Court's current jurisprudence
in the field of federal Indian law has mystified both academics and practitioners."); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for OurAge of Colonialism:The Judicial Divestiture of Indian TribalAuthority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J.
1, 4-5 (1999) ("Given the lack of guidance in positive law, the complexity of the
issues, and the tangled normative questions surrounding the colonial displacement of indigenous peoples to construct a constitutional democracy, it is
also not surprising that the resulting decisional law is as incoherent as it is
complicated."); Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the Edge of the Prairie,31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 439, 439 (1999) [hereinafter Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox] ("[Rlecent developments in Indian law,
particularly at the United States Supreme Court, threaten [a] well understood
and precarious balance with a new, almost vicious, historical amnesia and doctrinal incoherence."); Yuanchung Lee, Rediscovering the Constitutional Lineage of Federal Indian Law, 27 N.M. L. REV. 273, 275 (1997) ("Contemporary
confusion in Indian law results from a failure to recognize Indian law's close
familial ties to constitutional doctrines that lie at the core of the Supreme
Court's concerns during the last century."); Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the
Future:Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 217, 218 (1993) ("[N]o area of American law is more distinct,
anomalous, or confused than that relating to Native Americans."); Frank
Pommersheim, Tribal Court Jurisprudence:A SnapshotFrom the Field, 21 VT.
L. REV. 7, 38-39 (1996) ("One need only read a sampling of recent United
States Supreme Court Indian [1]aw opinions ... to realize that the nation's
high court has slipped into doctrinal incoherence."); Laurie Reynolds, "Jurisdiction" in FederalIndian Law: Confusion, Contradiction,and Supreme Court
Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359, 360 (1997) ("[Flor lower courts trying to decipher the implications of these pronouncements on tribal jurisdiction, the
Court's conflicting signals have created confusion and uncertainty."); Brad
Jolly, Comment, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering Policy
of Termination Continues, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273, 278 (1997) ("Over the past
century, the legal fiction of federal Indian law has matured into a grotesque
creature capable of inflicting instant disorientation, bewilderment, and nausea."); Ray Torgerson, Note, Sword Wielding and Shield Bearing:An Idealistic
Assessment of the Federal Trust Doctrine in American Indian Law, 2 TEX. F.
ON C.L. & C.R. 165, 178 (1996) ("Most academics and courts agree that the
area of Indian law is fraught with vacillation and incoherence."). See generally
Curtis G. Berkey, Recent Supreme CourtDecisions Bring New Confusion to the
Law of Indian Sovereignty, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 77 (National Lawyers
Guild Committee on Native American Indian Struggles ed., 1982).
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small number of cases decided in a short, albeit recent, period.
Thus, it may be too soon to toll the bell for the passing of Indian
law as generations of lawyers, courts, and tribes knew it.
Moreover, it could be self-fulfilling for scholars and judges to
overstate the degree of confusion and hopelessness in Indian
law. Painting a picture of abject confusion rather than seeking
to understand all of Indian law in its historical context has its
risks. It may imply that it is up to the Court to wade in and "do
justice."37 Nice though this may sound, licensing courts to reinvent Indian law based on the judges' notions of justice and
what is right for society could add legitimacy to an ethnocentric
judicial foray into Indian policy. Indian law has always been
based on the assumption that separate societies could exist exempt from the American melting pot, preserving customs, values, and governance of the vestiges of traditional tribal territory. Judges who are not steeped in the culture and values of
Indian tribalism are ill-equipped to rework these complex and
anomalous traditions case by case.
If Indian law is incoherent today, it is largely because the
present Supreme Court is shunning its own legal traditions and
creating new rules that conform to its perceptions of current
realities, instead of staying its hand and forcing the political
branches to deliberate the difficult choices. Reliance on Congress to decide clearly the bounds of Indian sovereignty-the
Court's primary approach until the mid-1980s-has nearly disappeared.
Congress certainly has made horrendous blunders-like
the allotment and termination policies, which it later had to reject in embarrassment.
Nevertheless, the legislative process
has an advantage over adjudication in that it is able to frame
policy that looks beyond a single fact situation. Moreover, today Indians participate fully in the legislative process.3 9 Unlike
a judge, who must decide an issue based on whatever record
was assembled below, Congress can define and redefine the is37. As if to respond to scholarly pleas for "coherence," Justice Souter has
proposed a radical, but simplifying, extension of one of the once marginal, now
pivotal cases in the Rehnquist Court's Indian law revolution: "If we are to see
coherence in the various manifestations of the general law of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the source of doctrine must be Montana v. United
States... ." Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1835 (2001)
(Souter, J., concurring).
38. GETCHES, supra note 21, at 140-90; see infra text accompanying notes

394-401.
39. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 47, 110.
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sues it addresses and delay its ultimate decision if it is equivocal or feels the need for more information. Policy change with
the full participation of affected parties, now the norm, is slow
and mercifully inefficient. Indeed, American Indian policy,
based on a commitment to promoting tribal self-determination,
has been rather constant for forty years.40
There are practical concerns raised by the Court's infidelity
to doctrine. The consequence of many Indian law decisions has
been to create highly unworkable situations. The Court's increasingly detailed jurisdictional rules depend on multiple factors such as the race and tribal membership of parties and
ownership of individual parcels of land, which seriously complicates the work of police, courts, and administrators, whether
they are employed by tribes or by non-Indian local or state governments.
Consider the result in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.41 The Court pieced together pluralities to recognize a tribe's authority to zone nonmembers' land within parts of the Yakima reservation and a
county's authority to zone nonmembers' land in other parts of
the same reservation." Apparently a plurality of the Court
would terminate a tribe's sovereignty over land use matters at
some point when non-Indians collectively gain ownership of an
unspecified percentage of land in an identifiable portion of the
reservation. Besides the curious implications for the nature of
sovereignty, it is nearly impossible for tribal and county officials-not to mention property owners-to apply the decision
rationally on the Yakima and other reservations. Zoning jurisdiction based on property ownership not only creates practical
problems but can undermine land use planning objectives. The
success of zoning laws depends on comprehensive planning over
a substantial area. The Court created a similarly impractical
40. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 180-88; Dean B. Suagee, The Cultural
Heritage of American Indian Tribes and the Preservationof Biological Diversity, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 483, 495-98 (1999).
41. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
42. See id. at 422-33.
43. See 2 ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §§
12.01, 12.04 (Edward H. Ziegler, Jr. rev. auth., 4th ed. 2001). "The requirement that zoning be 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan' is one of the
most fundamental concepts in land use regulation." Id. at § 12.01. "[A] very
close relationship between planning and zoning and other land use controls is
mandated. Land use regulations must reflect, be harmonious with, follow and
carry out designations in the [comprehensive] plan." Id. at § 12.04; see also
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jurisdictional rule when it decided that non-Indian plaintiffs
could not bring personal injury actions for accidents on the reservation against non-Indians in tribal court if the tort occurred
on the right-of-way for a state highway."
I have attributed the dramatic shift in the Supreme Court's
approach to Indian law to the Justices' inclination to follow
their subjective judgments as to what the jurisdictional arrangements and nature of tribal governance ought to be in the
cases that come before them.45 Analysis of the opinions of the
Rehnquist Court, corroborated by research into the internal
memoranda and draft opinions of some members of the Court,
shows the willingness of the Justices to chart Indian policy instead of leaving it to Congress.46 In the four Supreme Court
terms since I hypothesized that subjectivism best characterizes
the Court's approach, sixteen Indian cases have been decided.47
The thesis holds up in nearly all those decisions and is well4 8 Nevada v.
illustrated by cases like Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
4
9
Hicks, and Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government." The Court has continued to cut a swath through both
the subject matter and the geographic reach of tribal jurisdiction without even looking for clear signals from Congress.
Strate ended tribal court civil jurisdiction over many (but not

PATRICK J. ROHAN, 1 ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 1.02[3], 6 id. §
37.01[1]-[2] (1978); PETER W. SALISCH, JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND
USE REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS & PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND

USE LAW 23 (1998).
44.

Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).

45. Getches, supra note 2, at 1575.
46. Id.
47. Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001); Idaho v. United States, 121 S.
Ct. 2135 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001); C & L
Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 1589 (2001);
Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 1060
(2001); Arizona v. California, 120 S. Ct. 2304 (2000); Rice v. Cayetano, 528
U.S. 495 (2000); Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999);
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999); Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v.
Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999); Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523
U.S. 751 (1998); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998);
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
48. 520 U.S. 438.
49. 121 S.Ct. 2304.
50. 522 U.S. 520.

20011

BEYOND INDIAN LAW

all) roads on reservations in cases involving nonmembers. 5 1
Hicks held that state officials were immune from tribal jurisdiction even when they invaded an Indian home on tribal
land.2 Venetie declared that tribes lacked jurisdiction over the
lands in hundreds of Native villages, mostly remote places
where there is little other available law enforcement or government regulation. 3 With the exception of Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,5 4 the Court has continued its
trend of ignoring old precedent and traditional canons of construction favorable to Indians.

51. 520 U.S. at 448-59.
52. 121 S. Ct. at 2313.
53. 522 U.S. at 532-34. There are 227 Native villages either organized
pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act or otherwise recognized as tribes
by the United States. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 65 Fed. Reg.
13,298, 13,302-03 (March 13, 2000). The territory potentially governed by
these villages was approximately forty-four million acres, the amount of land
owned by the village corporations created under the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, had the Supreme Court not ruled that village lands were not
"Indian country." Venetie, 522 U.S. at 524-25.
54. 526 U.S. 172, 195-208 (1999) (finding that hunting and fishing rights
reserved by treaty were not abrogated by a subsequent Executive Order of removal, a treaty ceding Indian lands to the United States, or the admission of
Minnesota into statehood).
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Figure 1
Indian Decisions: For and AgainstBurger and Rehnquist Courts
Burger Court
1969-1985 Terms

Rehnquist Court
1986-2000 Terms

23%

77%

*%

For Ind. E% Ag. Ind.

*%

For Ind. M % Ag. Ind.

Beyond the departures from settled law, the cases show a
stunning record of losses for Indians.55 Tribal interests have
lost about 77% of all the Indian cases decided by the Rehnquist

Court in its fifteen terms,56 and 82% of the cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the last ten terms.5 7 This dismal track record stands in contrast to the record tribal interests chalked up
in the Burger years, when they won 58% of their Supreme
55. See Figure 1. The data for Figure 1 were compiled by the author
based on an analysis and tabulation of all Indian Supreme Court decisions for
the periods indicated.
56. During its fifteen terms (1986-2001), the Rehnquist Court has decided
forty Indian law cases; of those decisions, tribal interests have won nine cases,
or 22.5% of the total. In its seventeen terms (1969-1986), the Burger Court
decided sixty-seven Indian cases; tribal interests prevailed in thirty-nine
cases, or 58% of the total. These figures represent decisions on the merits
with a written decision. The author calculated these figures based on data
compiled from his analysis of the Indian law cases for the period indicated.
57. Indian tribal interests lost all but five of the twenty-eight Indian law
cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 1991-2000 Terms. See Idaho v.
United States, 121 S. Ct. 2135 (2001); Arizona v. California, 120 S. Ct. 2304
(2000); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172; Kiowa Tribe v.
Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation,
508 U.S. 114 (1993).
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Court cases. It would be difficult to find a field of law or a type
of litigant that fares worse than Indians do in the Rehnquist
Court. Convicted criminals achieved reversals in 36% of all
cases that reached the Supreme Court in the same period,"
compared to the tribes' 23% success rate. Figure 2 shows the
record of decisions for and against Indian interests in the Supreme Court from the beginning of the modem era (1958 Term)
to the present.5 9
Figure 2
Percentage of Decisions For and Against Indians in
the Supreme Court - 1958-2000 Terms

Term
I

%

For Ind.

% Ag. Ind.

-Trend

(% For Ind.) I

58. In the 1986-2000 Terms defendants prevailed in 111 out of 310 criminal cases decided by the Supreme Court. Compiled from data in reviews of the
1986-1999 Supreme Court Terms published in Volumes 101-114, HARV. L.
REV., and for the 2000 Term from 70 U.S.L.W. 3060 (2001).
59. The data for Figure 2 were compiled by the author based on an analysis and tabulation of all Indian Supreme Court decisions for the periods indicated.
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Win-loss statistics like these have to be viewed with caution. They may reflect nothing more than a difference in the
type or difficulty of cases before the Court. Thus, it is necessary to look more closely at the types of cases that were before
the Court.
If the Court today were dealing with a disproportionate
number of cases that implicate non-Indian interests and values, this might explain the different results. It is true that the
Supreme Court has had some novel and difficult issues before it
in recent years, especially cases involving unsettled questions
of jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservations. The
Court's departures from established principles of Indian law
have been especially abrupt when control of non-Indian interests-property within a reservation, 6 subjection to tribal regulation or judgments,6 ' the applicability of state law,62 or even
non-Indian social values 6 3-was at stake. Its decisions creating
exceptions and special rules in cases where tribes attempted to
control non-Indians have been strongly criticized.'
The Rehnquist Court's decisions have prevented tribes
from trying and punishing non-Indian criminal defendants,65
from regulating nonmembers' fishing and hunting on nonIndian land, 66 from zoning nonmember land in white communi60. E.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1835 (2001)
(holding the Navajo Nation's imposition of a hotel tax upon nonmembers on
non-Indian fee land within the reservation invalid).
61. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (2001) (denying a tribal
court jurisdiction over a suit by a tribal member alleging trespass against his
property on tribal land by a state game warden); Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
520 U.S. 438, 456-59 (1997) (holding that, absent congressional authorization,
tribal courts may not exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers driving on a
state highway).
62. See infraPart VII.B, notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990) (holding that a state's prohibition of the sacramental use of peyote
and denial of unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use does
not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
64. E.g., Aaron S. Duck, Note, Indians: Modern Tribal JurisdictionOver
Non-Indian Parties:The Supreme Court Takes Another Bite Out of Tribal Sovereignty in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 51 OELA. L. REV. 727, 745-46 (1998)
("Strate cuts to the very core of tribal self-government and selfdetermination.").
65. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978).
66. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-67 (1981); see also
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697 (1993) (holding that Congress's
authorization of a water project had "abrogated the Tribe's 'absolute and undisturbed use and occupation' [of certain lands] and thereby deprived the
Tribe of the power to license non-Indian use of the lands").
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ties on the reservation,"7 from taxing non-Indian hotel guests
on the reservation when the hotel is on non-Indian land,6" from
hearing personal injury lawsuits between non-Indians for accidents on non-Indian land within the reservation,6 9 and from
hearing suits brought by tribal members for torts committed
against them on tribal land by non-Indian state officials. °
Moreover, even in cases where non-Indian interests were more
attenuated, the Court has retreated from the deeply-rooted judicial approaches of respecting tribal sovereignty and deferring
to congressional power in the field.7 ' The venerable principles
that had guided the field since the nation's founding have been
invoked only when a treaty or statute left little doubt about
Congress's intent, and the result would only indirectly affect
non-Indian expectations,7 2 or when the Court would have had
to overrule a well-established decision to decide otherwise.7
By contrast, perhaps the work of the Burger Court was
dominated by more clear-cut cases involving unjustified extensions of state jurisdiction over Indians, to which it could more
conveniently adapt the old precedents of the Marshall trilogy to
define limits on state power in Indian country.
If the
Rehnquist Court has had to mediate thorny tribal assertions of
jurisdiction over non-Indians while its predecessor dealt primarily with simpler cases in which Indians on reservations
sought to be shielded from extensions of state law, the difference in subject matter might explain the different records of
the two eras. The facts, however, do not justify this conclusion.
The non-Indian jurisdiction cases are not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have dealt
67. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 421-33 (1989).
68. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1835 (2001).
69. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456-59 (1997).
70. See Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (2001).
71. See, e.g., Dep't of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512
U.S. 61, 78 (1994) (holding valid a New York law requiring tribal record keeping of cigarette sales to non-Indians); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421-22
(1994) (holding that the tribe's criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians had been
diminished by Congress); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698 (1990) (holding
that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers).
72. See, for example, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (1999), discussed infra at notes 385-91 and accompanying text.
73. See, for example, Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758
(1998), reluctantly following precedent upholding tribal sovereign immunity
but inviting congressional attention by noting that "Itihere are reasons to
doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine."

284

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:267

with about the same number of jurisdiction cases involving
non-Indians,74 but the results were quite different. In cases
where seemingly disenfranchised non-Indians within a reservation sought to escape tribal control, the Rehnquist Court's protection of non-Indian interests has been far greater. Of the ten
cases in which tribal control over nonmembers' conduct or
property was at issue,75 it rejected the tribe's claimed jurisdiction in all but two cases. It did not disturb tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,
which simply extended a ruling made two years before in a
nearly identical situation.76 In addition, one part of the deeply
fragmented decision in Brendale allowed the tribe to extend its
zoning authority over a nonmember's land in an isolated part of
the Yakima reservation but subjected land in another part of

74. The Burger Court decided six cases involving state assertions ofjurisdiction over nonmembers, Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9 (1985); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue,
458 U.S. 832 (1982); Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160
(1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976),
and eight cases involving tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, Nat'l Farmers
Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130 (1982); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). The Rehnquist Court has decided four cases
involving state jurisdiction over nonmembers, Ariz. Dep't of Revenue v. Blaze
Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999); Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea &
Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,
490 U.S. 163 (1989), and ten cases involving tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, see infranote 75.
75. Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S.
473 (1999); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998);
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993);
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9 (1987).
76. 480 U.S. at 15-16. In National Farmers,471 U.S. 845, the Court held
that litigants must exhaust their tribal court remedies before challenging the
tribal court's jurisdiction in a federal court action brought under federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 857. In Iowa Mutual, the Court extended its holding
in National Farmersto include cases brought under diversity jurisdiction as
well as federal question jurisdiction. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 15-16.
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the reservation to county zoning.77 By contrast, the Burger
Court ruled in favor of subjecting non-Indians to tribal jurisdiction in six out of eight cases.7"
It remains true, however, that in fifteen terms the
Rehnquist Court has decided fewer of the arguably easier cases
in which Indian or tribal interests within a reservation claimed
immunity from state law than the Burger Court did in its seventeen terms. The reason for this could be that review was
sought in fewer such cases, but the difference in outcomes of
the state jurisdiction cases that were decided by the two Courts
is still notable: State jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country has prevailed in 54% of the cases in the Rehnquist Court
compared to 38% of the cases in the preceding period. When
the statistics for all the jurisdiction cases are combined, the record shows that tribal interests lost 70% of the time in the
Rehnquist
Court, while they won 63% of the time in the Burger
Court. 79

77. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432. Brendale is usually considered a loss for
the tribe, however. See John S. Harbison, The Broken Promise Land: An Essay on Native American Tribal Sovereignty over Reservation Resources, 14
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 347, 347-50, 364-67 (1995).
78. For a list of these eight cases, see supra note 74. The cases in which
the Court did not uphold tribal jurisdiction were Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. at 556-57 (denying regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on nonIndian land), and Oliphant,435 U.S. at 191 (denying criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians).
79. See Figure 3, which was compiled by the author from a tabulation of
all Indian jurisdiction cases in the Supreme Court's 1969-2000 Terms. Two
decisions arising out of the same attempt of a tribe to invoke state court jurisdiction were excluded. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138 (1984); Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) (reversing
the disposition on remand).
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Figure 3
Indian Jurisdiction Cases in the Supreme Court
1969-2000
Burger Court
Number of Decisions FaDecisions
voring Tribes
Cases re:
State Juris-

#

%

Rehnquist Court
Number of
Decisions FaDecisions
voring Tribes

diction
Over
Nonmembers

6

3

50%

0

0%

Over Indians

21

13

62%

6

46%

Cases re:
Tribal Jurisdiction

8

6

75%

2

20%

35*

22*

63%

8**

30%

over nonmembers
Totals

27**

*Totals include Moe, 425 U.S. 463, as two cases because it involved state jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians, and Colville, 447 U.S. 134, as three cases
because it involved state jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians and tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
**Totals include Brendale, 492 U.S. 408, as two cases because it involved
state and tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.

There are several theoretical explanations for the radically different statistical results of the Rehnquist Court in Indian law. Although the subject matter of Indian litigation in
the earlier period was not entirely different, the particular
cases were somewhat simpler, perhaps today tribes are pressing claims at the margins of the law. It is doubtful that the
trend in outcomes can be explained entirely by the heightened
difficulty of the cases, however. The major cases of the preceding period were considered significant in their time too.8" In
80. See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 4 ("[Tlhe Justices [in the modern era
prior to 19861 have laid down a large number of clearly stated rules that have
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any event, the statistics are extreme enough to motivate a
deeper search for explanations of the decisional trend. If, as I
have posited, the Court is deciding Indian cases based on the
Justices' subjective views, predicting the nature of changes in
the law will depend on achieving a better understanding of
their preferences and values.
III. THE CONSISTENCY OF THE COURTS ACTIVITY IN
INDIAN LAW WITH ITS RECORD IN OTHER CASES
The Court has been particularly active in Indian law.
Whether departures from precedent are typical of its record
generally or are peculiar to its work in Indian law may indicate
whether it has a special interest in the field. A review of
Rehnquist Court decisions and subsequent commentary shows
that in fields other than Indian law, the Court has been not
only ignoring and departing from precedent, but overruling
cases and striking down the work of coordinate branches.8
The Rehnquist Court has been strongly and frequently
criticized for its disloyalty to precedent. Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has been candid in stating that stare decisis is
merely a "principle of policy" 2 and that the Court is "obliged to
reexamine" "unsound" precedent.8 3 In Payne v. Tennessee, the
Court overruled two earlier cases that excluded evidence of the

resolved conceptual issues of great significance to Indian law and policy....
Further, in my view the decisions generally have been principled, even courageous.").
81. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 30 (5th ed. 2000). One observer has written, without specific reference to Indian law, that the elevation of William Rehnquist to the
post of Chief Justice "marked a turning point in the Court's decisional outlook." STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM, THE REHNQUIsT COURT: IN PURSUIT OF
JUDICIAL CONSERVATIVISM xiii (1994).
82. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
83. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 955 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One commentator says that
Casey, where the majority did follow precedent and left standing the abortion
rights decision in Roe v. Wade, actually revealed the shallowness of the Court's
commitment to stare decisis. Carolyn D. Richmond, The Rehnquist Court:
What Is in Store for ConstitutionalLaw Precedent?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
511, 512 (1994). In Casey, the four-person minority led by the Chief Justice
zealously urged overruling Roe v. Wade, while the five-person majority seemed
concerned primarily with damage to the Court's own credibility if it were to
back-track on such a highly visible and frequently revisited issue. See id. at
541-42.
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impact of a crime on the victim's family.84 Each of the opinions
in the case ventilated different views about the circumstances
that warrant overruling precedent. The Chief Justice pressed
the most aggressive approach to overruling. He especially favored critical review of closely decided precedents and decisions
rendered over spirited dissents. He said that arguments for
stare decisis were strongest when reliance interests present in
property rights or contract cases were involved and weakest in
constitutional cases.85 For this, Rehnquist was taken to task in
a dissent by Justice Thurgood Marshall.8 6
According to one observer, "[T]he current Supreme Court is
extremely activist."87 Another says that the Rehnquist Court's
"disavowed activism is difficult to conceal." 8 These assessments are based on the fact that "there is little adherence to
precedent ...[Sitare decisis may no longer be relied upon as a
84. 501 U.S. at 830, overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987),
and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
85. Id. at 828; see also Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in HistoricalPerspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647,
734-35 (1999) (arguing that the idea that stare decisis is strongest in cases involving commercial reliance has deep historical roots traceable to the Founders, while the idea that constitutional precedent is more susceptible to reversal is relatively new).
86. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
Renouncing this Court's historical commitment to a conception of "the
judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments," the majority declares itself free to discard any principle of constitutional liberty which was recognized or reaffirmed over the dissenting votes of
four Justices and with which five or more Justices now disagree. The
implications of this radical new exception to the doctrine of stare decisis are staggering. The majority today sends a clear signal that
scores of established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration, thereby inviting the very type of open defiance of our precedents that the majority rewards in this case.
Id. (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)).
87. Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1367,
1400 (1996); see also HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE
OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
273 ("The Rehnquist Court has been not only conservative, but activist....").
Spaeth and Segal apply a precedential versus preferential model to test the
Court's loyalty to precedent. See id. at 7-8. They look at the behavior of Justices in landmark cases to see if,
after dissenting in the case, they adhere to
the rejected position in the future. See id. at 5. The Rehnquist Court ranks in
the top three "preferential" courts ever in terms of the Justices' refusal to depart from their preferences to accept precedent. See id. at 278. Empirical
studies show that the Rehnquist Court has opted for judicial preferences over
precedent in 97.8% of the progeny of landmark decisions that have come before it, more than the Burger or Warren Courts that preceded it. Id. at 277.
88. FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 81, at xvi.
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consistent indicator of the direction of constitutional law jurisprudence in the Supreme Court."8 9
The fact that a court does not follow precedent, however,
should not necessarily brand it an activist court. Critics accuse
courts of being activist or lacking self-restraint whenever they
dislike outcomes20 Indeed, the more satisfied one is with the
status quo, the more likely he or she is to favor judicial restraint, and vice versa.9' Thus, if former Courts had supplanted the roles of coordinate branches of government or were
misguided in application of fundamental principles, one might
expect that a Court composed of a majority favoring judicial restraint would nevertheless react by overturning or refusing to
follow earlier cases. The Justices might reasonably resist being
enslaved by old approaches they find to be wrong. In this respect, the Court is probably like most that have gone before it.
Whether the Court's rejection of precedent constitutes activism
or is incidental to remedying the activism or wrongheadedness
of earlier courts cannot be measured solely by the frequency of
its departures from precedent.
A better indicator of activism may be the Court's ardor
for making new law, as indicated by its willingness to strike
down statutes or to expand the judicial function by invading
the roles of coordinate branches, articulating new constitutional dimensions to issues, and deciding issues that were not
decided below. 92
89. Richmond, supra note 83, at 511-12. Richmond concludes that there is
virtually no predictability to be found and that the Rehnquist Court is on a
"search and destroy mission." Id. at 511.
90. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 802, 811-31 (1982). Easterbrook levels similar criticisms at the Burger
Court: "[While admitting that it is bound by the written documents, the [Burger] Court continues to hand down inconsistent decisions, to dishonor precedents, and to change the weight attached to particular constitutional and
statutory provisions or the values derived from them." Id. at 812.
91. See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 586-90 (1989-90). For instance, although
Justice Scalia has advocated that judges adhere to a set of neutral principles
and deference to legislative will, he also has allowed that courts need not be
consistent if it would lead to a result that would be "simply wrong." Id. at 589.
92. See
WILLIAM
N.
ESKEIDGE,
JR.,
DYNAMIC
STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 2 (1994) (asserting that "the Rehnquist Court may be the
most activist Court in our history on issues of statutory interpretation"); John
C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in ConstitutionalLaw, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1248 (1998) (stating that from 1995 to
1997, the Supreme Court issued twelve opinions invalidating acts of Congress,
and to find a comparable period of judicial activity, one must go back to the
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The Rehnquist Court's record of departures from precedent
has resulted in active revision of constitutional rights and undoing of legislative decisions.
Some commentators have
pointed to this Court's propensity to invalidate federal statutes
as one of the most remarkable examples of "the decay of restraint."93 A critical study by Professor Donald Zeigler notes
that the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, which found
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional,94
marked the first time in sixty years that legislation based on
the Commerce Clause had been held to exceed Congress's
power. 5 According to the same study, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 6 the Court fabricated a new defense for government contractors who were subjected to tort claims. 7 Zeigler
also argues that the Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council9" is an example of the Court going beyond the
text of the Constitution, as well as prior judicial interpretations, to find that a state law restricting home construction on
beachfront lots to an area not subject to erosion could be the
basis for a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. 9
Others have noted that the Court's approach to racial justice cases has required formulating new theory as well as making "striking departures from its prior constitutional jurisprudence."0 0 The Court also has been accused of manufacturing
new constitutional principles to support its overrulings.' 0 ' In
addition, Professor Chemerinsky has cited the Court's propensity to reach out and decide issues that were not ruled on by
period from 1934 to 1936); Zeigler, supra note 87, at 1369 (contending that the
Rehnquist Court has engaged in broad-based activism as indicated by its articulation of new constitutional rights, overturning of statutes, alteration of
doctrines defining access to judicial review, and rejection or disregard of
precedent); A Court Running in the Wrong Direction,N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1995,
at A20 (editorializing that in the 1994 Term the Court was "toppling doctrines
and precedents that had held for decades" while displaying "a disrespect [for
Congress] bordering on contempt").
93. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 92, at 1247.
94. 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
95. Zeigler, supra note 87, at 1400.
96. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
97. Zeigler, supra note 87, at 1383.
98. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
99. Zeigler, supra note 87, at 1375-80.
100. Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the Rehnquist
Court's Commitment To Color Blindness Versus Racial Justice, 45 AM. U. L.
REV. 763, 764 (1996).
101. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 92, at 1211-12.
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the lower courts as indicative of the Court's activism.
In Indian law, I have argued, the present Court not only
shuns precedent, but assumes a role in Indian affairs that historically belonged to Congress and was respected by virtually
every preceding Court. To the extent that the Rehnquist Court
is activist in its approach to cases generally, its activity in Indian law may be less surprising, but this still fails to explain
what would attract the Court to accept and decide a large number of cases in the field of Indian law. Furthermore, because
activism does not have inherent philosophical content, what is
it, as a "principle of policy," that moves the Court to deem lower
court decisions to be "unsound" or "simply wrong"?0 3

IV. A SEARCH FOR THE COURTS INDIAN LAW AGENDA
One theory is that the Court is motivated by its own
agenda in Indian law and is looking for opportunities to implement its ideas. The Court may be specifically concerned with
the foundational principles themselves and may have doubts
about their legitimacy, justice, or application. The Court, however, has rarely criticized or attempted to distinguish these
principles. The dearth of reference to precedent' 4 makes it
unlikely that this is the Court's focus.
Regardless of whether the Court has addressed the foundations of Indian law in its opinions, it is conceivable that it has
in mind a new or preferable construct to impose on cases in the
field. If that is so, it should be evident in the opinions, but, in
reading the cases, I have not been able to find any articulation
of what the Court's new vision would be. Nor has the Court expressed any philosophical principles specific to Indian law that
would explain the coalitions of majorities. Other observers also
have been unable to find a plausible rationale for the decisions.
Professor Frickey has made the most rigorous attempt to synthesize the Court's recent Indian decisions within possible
theoretical constructs.0 5 After finding that "the opinions con102. Erwin Chemerinsky, The New Judicial Activism, CAL. LAW., Feb.
2000, at 25-26.
103. See supra notes 82-83, 91 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
105. Frickey, supra note 36, at 58-81 (attempting to reconceptualize recent
decisions using several hypothetical approaches in a search for doctrinal coherence). Professor Frickey undertakes a far more penetrating analysis than
the Court itself has done in seeking to justify its decisions. He concludes that
none of the approaches satisfactorily explains the Courts results. Id. at 7-8.

292

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:267

0 6 he tests a variety of possible
geal into an incoherent muddle,""
rationales that might provide a more coherent nexus for the
cases as a whole, or even Indian decisions of certain types, and
concludes that none gives a satisfactory explanation for what
the Court is doing."'
For about forty years the Court's docket has included a
surprisingly high percentage of Indian cases.' s The annual average number of Indian cases decided by the Rehnquist Court is
slightly lower than in the preceding period, but as Figure 4 indicates, the Court has matched the record of its predecessors in
the percentage of Indian cases it has decided. 9 Unless the
Court is motivated to reform Indian law, one must ask why it

Moreover, he concludes that all the approaches "are rooted... in a normatively unattractive judicial colonial impulse beneath the dignity of the best
qualities of federal Indian law." Id. at 7.
106. Id. at 57.
107. Id.
108. See Figure 4. Figure 4 was compiled by the author from his own tabulation of the Indian cases and from data on Supreme Court decisions, including LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS (2d ed. 1996), and reviews of Supreme Court
Terms published in volumes 109-114, HARv. L. REV. (1995-2000), and for the
2000 Term from U.S.L.W. 3060 (2001).
In the "modern era," the Court was "more active in Indian law than in
fields such as securities, bankruptcy, pollution control, and international law."
WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 2. Wilkinson reports that thirty-five Indian law
cases were decided by the Supreme Court during the 1970s. Id. My tabulation shows that in the 1980s the Court rendered forty such decisions and in
the 1990s decided twenty-six Indian law cases.
109. From 1958 to 2000, about 2.4% (121 of 4853 cases) of the Court's total
decisions on the merits were Indian cases. In the Rehnquist Court (1986-2000
Terms), about 2.7% (41 of 1510 cases) of the decisions have been in Indian
cases. The average number of Indian cases decided has dropped in recent
years, but the percentage of Indian cases has remained the same because the
overall number of cases decided by the Court has fallen drastically.
Caseload reduction has been one of the hallmarks of the Rehnquist
Court. O'BRIEN, supra note 81, at 234-35. After hovering at about 150 cases
per year from 1971 until the late 1980s, the Court's workload was nearly half
that number by 1995. Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the
Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 403. Meanwhile, the workload of
the courts of appeals increased 150%, and the number of petitions for review
in the Supreme Court nearly doubled. Id. at 403-04; see also Michael L.
Closen, The Decade of Supreme CourtAvoidance of AIDS: Denial of Certiorari
in HIV-AIDS Cases and Its Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 61 ALB. L. REV.
897, 924-25 (1998) (discussing the diminishing number of cases taken on by
the Rehnquist Court); David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the
Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court's Shrinking PlenaryDocket, 13 J.L. & POL.
779, 808 (1997) (arguing that the contraction of the docket during the
Rehnquist years reflects changes in the composition of the bench).
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accepts a disproportionately large number of Indian cases compared to the numbers of cases it hears from other fields. Subjective indicators point away from the conclusion that the Court
is drawn by its interest in Indian law to include a large share of
Indian cases on its docket. According to statements and sentiments attributed to Justices by "insiders," the subject matter
has not been attractive to many Justices, and being assigned
an Indian case is reputed to be an unwelcome chore.1 1
Even if the Court lacks an agenda to reform the law in the
field, it may nevertheless have an "agenda" expressed in terms
of fulfilling its responsibilities as the nation's court of last resort. Those responsibilities may include one or more of the following: resolving cases of importance affecting a great number
of people; defining the scope of federal jurisdiction or procedure;
resolving conflicts between the lower courts; and correcting
lower court decisions that stray from established law or misapply Supreme Court precedent."'

110. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 359, 412 (1979). "Brennan felt that he got terrible assignments from... Chief [Justice Burger]. One decision he was assigned to write
(Antoine v. Washington) addressed the question of whether Indians in Washington state could hunt and fish in the off season.... Brennan seethed at
having to write this 'chickenshit case." Id. at 359. "[Inn January, when the
next assignment sheet came around, Rehnquist got only one case from Burger-an insignificant Indian tax dispute in Montana (Moe v. Tribes of the
FlatheadReservation) ....[H]e suspected that the assignment was Burger's
way of telling him what he really thought...." Id. at 412; see also Philip P.
Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretationin FederalIndian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (1993)
("For most of those who follow the Court, these cases were almost certainly
viewed as 'crud,' even if 'kind of fascinating,' 'peewee' cases . ... ") (footnotes
and citations omitted).
111. See ROBERT L. STERN ETAL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 196-220, 37475 (6th ed. 1986). Rule 19, Rules of the U.S. Supreme Court, mentions the latter two reasons. See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 37-45 (1980). Some observers posit that the Court's
vagueness about its criteria for case selection is intentional and contributes to
its ability to exercise wide discretion. See id. Others have examined the
Court's strategic or agenda-building behavior in case selection. See, e.g.,
RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
AGENDA 8-12 (1991).
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Figure 4
Indian Decisions as a Percentage of Signed Decisions in
the Supreme Court
1958-2000 Terms
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Absent any special interest of the Justices in the subject
matter, the Court may feel duty bound to hear and resolve certain types of cases because of the intensity of controversy. In
the early days of the nation, Indian relations were important
both to politicians and to the public who looked to the Court to
resolve tough questions of national or regional notoriety. This
may account for cases like Cherokee"2 and Worcester,"' which
were pivotal in defining federalism. Since then, the spotlight of
national attention has rarely shone upon Indian issues. Today,
except in a few states where the proportion of Native Americans is high relative to total population, or except when Indian
cases are perceived to raise issues beyond Indian law, they are

112. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831) (holding
that Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations, not foreign nations).
113. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that state
laws do not govern non-Indians within Indian reservations because of federal
preemption and tribal sovereignty).
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little noticed by the media or by politicians.1 1 4 Because reservations are typically located in remote areas and Indians often
lack political influence, "The non-Indian world simply does not
notice decisions affecting Indian rights.""5
If Indian cases are not "important" enough in the national
scheme to induce the Court to accept an extraordinary number
of them, perhaps the Court is concerned with correcting lower
court misapplications of existing law. During the modern era, a
convincing argument could be made that this was why the
Court accepted a large number of Indian cases. The Court continually reached down to accept cases and reverse decisions in
which state courts, and sometimes lower federal courts, had not
correctly applied the foundational principles in Indian law. By

114. One example of an Indian case that attracted considerable public attention and controversy was Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998). In Alaska, Natives constitute 16.8% of the
population.
DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR &
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, ALASKA POPULATION OVERVIEW 20 tbl.1.4 (2000).
However, in rural areas, 52% of the population is Native. E-mail communication with Laura Walters, Research Analyst, State of Alaska, Department of
Community & Economic Development (Aug. 23, 2000) (on file with the author). Moreover, 82% of rural communities have greater than 70% Native
population. Id.
In Venetie, the tribal government tried to collect taxes from a private contractor for conducting business activities on the tribe's land. See 522 U.S. at
525. The state successfully fought these Native attempts to assert Indian
country jurisdiction. See id. at 523. The case was not only highly visible and
controversial in Alaska, but attracted an amicus curiae brief signed by twentyfive states arguing essentially a states' rights theme. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of California et al., Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
522 U.S. 520 (1998) (No. 96-1577). A similar brief was signed by the Council
of State Governments and the Alaska State Legislature. Brief of Amici Curiae
Legislature of the State of Alaska et al., Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie
Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (No. 96-1577). After their attempts to
achieve recognition for village self-governance failed, Native interests sued the
state claiming inadequate law enforcement. Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v.
State, No. 3DI-99-113-CI (Alaska Super. Ct. filed Oct. 25, 1999).
Similarly, a battle over whether to invalidate attempts of the State of
Hawaii to administer state and federal benefits for Native Hawaiians through
an independent state board under trustees selected in a Natives-only election
attracted attention from opponents of affirmative action and other racespecific programs. Three briefs were filed in opposition to Hawaii's plan.
Brief of Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Brief of Amici Curiae
Campaign for a Color Blind America et al., Brief of Amici Curiae Center for
Equal Opportunity et al., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818).
The Court struck down the voting scheme as a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000).
115. Louis F. Claiborne, The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions in Indian
Cases, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 585, 587 (1997).
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contrast, however, the Rehnquist Court has frequently reversed
the lower courts' attempts to apply established legal principles
and precedents favoring tribal interests." 6 The Court may be
implying that the old approaches simply do not fit the facts at
hand. In any event, the ad hoc rules being developed lack a
jurisprudential touchstone.
The Supreme Court often accepts cases for administrative
or institutional reasons. One important reason for review is to
resolve conflicts in the courts below. Because this was the apparent reason for reviewing a mere six (or 17% of the total) Indian cases in the Rehnquist
Court, it cannot explain the num117
ber of cases accepted.
Another possibility is that the Court accepts and decides
Indian cases in order to achieve justice in individual circumstances. Although Indians constitute less than 1% of the national population," 8 the lives of Indians are impacted by law
more pervasively than are the lives of most other Americans. 9
A compelling argument for why the Court might be concerned
with Indian law, then, is to ensure that the law is applied properly and fairly to a peculiarly law-affected minority. If my previous characterization of the Court's results is accurate, and
116. Of the Indian cases accepted by the Rehnquist Court, then reversed or
vacated, the author's survey shows that tribal interests have won only 20% of
the time. By contrast, the Burger Court reversed or vacated judgments in favor of tribes about 50% of the time. The author calculated these figures based
on data compiled from his analysis of the Indian law cases for the periods indicated.
117. Conflicts between circuits include Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99,
102 (1993), and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684 (1990), effectively overruled
by 25 U.S.C. §1301(2) (3) & (4) (1990); conflicts between a court of appeals and
a state supreme court include South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S.
329, 342 (1998), Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 409 (1994), and Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 122 (1993); conflicts between state courts include C & L Enterprises,Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (2001), and MississippiBand of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 41 (1989).
In fact, some cases accepted appear to have no potential whatsoever
for conflict among jurisdictions. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498
(2000) (presenting an issue unique to Hawaii and its state constitution); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188 (1999) (construing a treaty on which the only affected circuits were in agreement). For
more information on Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, see
infra notes 386-91 and accompanying text.
118. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
20 tbl.11 (120th ed. 2000).
119. COHEN, supra note 1, at vii ("Law dominates Indian life in a way not
duplicated in other segments of American society.").
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the Supreme Court's decisions in Indian law have gravely impacted Indians and tribes and have created confusion for their
neighbors, concern for the effects on Indians does not emerge as
the mission of the present Court.
The Court may, in fact, be more concerned with correcting
the perceived injustices of applying Indian law principles to the
rights or conduct of non-Indians. 12 0 Some of the Rehnquist
Court's Indian decisions appear to have been attempts to rectify what it considered anomalous results reached in the lower
courts in order to ensure protection for the interests of nonIndians. 2 ' Jurists unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the idea of
tribes exercising sovereignty over their territory may be disinclined to view the boundaries of Indian country as they do the
boundaries of a state or foreign nation-as triggering jurisdictional consequences for all who enter. So the Court may be
beckoned by the opportunity to draw lines that limit tribes to
regulating their own members on a reservation, as a social club
would regulate its members on its own property, and to assure
that nonmembers can come and go unmolested by tribal law.
This would minimize the anomaly of separate enclaves that
does not fit with conventional notions of American life and governance.
The idea of Indians governing non-Indians who do not participate in tribal governance could seem undemocratic and, if
one sees Indian justice systems as strange or primitive, perhaps risky. Language used in the Court's opinions reflects
skepticism of tribal governance of non-Indians. 2 2 This rhetoric
120. Getches, supra note 2, at 1574.
121. For cases in which initial results favoring tribal interests were reversed by the Court, see Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1835 (2001); C & L Enterprises v.
Citizen Band PotawatomiIndian Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 1589, 1597 (2001); Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 1060,
1070 (2001); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 524 (2000); Amoco Production Co.
v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 880 (1999); El Paso Natural Gas
Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 488 (1999); Arizona Department of Revenue v.
Blaze ConstructionCo., 526 U.S. 32, 39 (1999); Montanav. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696, 719 (1998); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U.S. 329, 358 (1998); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 460 (1997);
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 697-98 (1993); Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 788 (1991); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 698
(1990); and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian

Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 432-33 (1989).
122. See, e.g., 121 S. Ct. at 2323 ("Tribal courts also differ from other
American courts... in their structure, in the substantive law they apply, and
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suggests that some members of the Court question the competence and fairness of Indian courts and governments, are troubled by the separatism and special rights of Indians and their
impact on non-Indians, or see the operation of tribal governments as anomalous in a federal system.
It is a plausible hypothesis that these factors have piqued
the Court's sense of justice sufficiently to induce it to accept
and decide many of its Indian cases. Yet, inferences drawn
from language in some cases and the fact that a preponderance
of the cases have favored non-Indian interests do not explain
the Rehnquist Court's acceptance of fully half of its Indian law
cases, where justice for non-Indian interests is not a significant
factor. In any event, it is important to ask whether there may
be more pervasive explanations for the Court's docketing of a
disproportionate number of Indian law cases.
If the Court has a clear agenda in Indian law, its opinions
do not provide clear statements of its philosophy or purpose.
Nor do the results or rationales in its recent decisions point to
an identifiable agenda or coherent theory of Indian law. 123 Assuming the Court has no Indian agenda, it may be that the Indian cases are influenced by interpretive theory or by more
pervasive values and preferences of the Justices that are evident in its decisions outside Indian law. Thus, my task here is
to look beyond Indian law for indicators of the Court's direction.
V. REHNQUIST COURT DECISIONS AND INTERPRETIVE
THEORY
If the Court is interested neither in reforming nor in perin the independence of their judges."); Rice, 528 U.S. at 523 ("All citizens, regardless of race, have an interest in selecting officials who make policies on
their behalf, even if those policies will affect some groups more than others.");
Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 ("[R]equiring [non-Indians] to defend against this
commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar court is not crucial to 'the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the [Three Affiliated Tribes].'") (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 566 (1981) (footnote omitted)); Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 ("While modern
tribal courts include many familiar features of the judicial process, they are
influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they
serve."); Brendale, 492 U.S. at 437 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by O'Connor,
J., announcing the judgment of the Court) ("[it is... improbable that Congress envisioned that the Tribe would retain its interest in regulating the use
of vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice in setting
tribal policy."). For a more detailed discussion of Strate and Hicks, see infra
notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
123. Frickey, supra note 36, at 6-7.
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petuating the established principles of Indian law, its decisions
might nevertheless be linked by a particular approach to interpretation. Nearly all cases before the Supreme Court-and, it
is fair to say, all Indian cases before the Court-turn on construction of the Constitution, treaties, or statutes. By the time
a case reaches the highest court in the land it is never open and
shut, and certainly not so in the minds of the parties. So there
usually are tough questions about whether and how various
texts apply. Interpretive theory proposes several approaches
that describe or prescribe the mission of courts when they are
called upon to apply these texts to a particular case.' 24
Theories can be arrayed along a spectrum of apparent judicial involvement in divining statutory meaning.'25 The principal schools of thought differ in the degree to which a court
should be bound to text versus being involved in a search for
purpose. Textualism gives judges the limited role of searching
for plain meaning and refraining from applying the statute beyond an ambit of clear applicability.'2 6 Originalism is an allied
theory that admits contemporaneous evidence of the drafters'
intent7 and accords it nearly the same probative legitimacy as
12
text.
Some theories task courts with the responsibility of looking
more broadly to determine the purpose behind the law. Legal
process, for instance, puts the court into the shoes of the legislature, endeavoring to determine which interpretation would
124. Because of the close and complicated nature of most cases before the
Court, some have argued that "discussion [of interpretive methods] turns out
to be sterile because these methods rarely yield ... answers in the type of case
that reaches the high court." STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE
REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY IN AMIERICA x (2000).
125. Brevity of description risks misrepresenting, or under-representing,
the interpretive theories, and generalizations blur the variations within each.
For fuller explications of each see the leading texts: WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1995), OTTO J.
HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (2d ed. 1993) and WILLIAM D.
POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1997).
126. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CIE. L.
REV. 533 (1983). Judge Posner would broaden the judicial inquiry by commissioning courts to engage in "imaginative reconstruction" of how the drafters
would have applied the language if they had thought of the situation at the
time. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
286-87 (1985).
127. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). "[Qlriginalist" methods of statutory interpretation consider the drafter's intent or the original purpose of the statute. Id.
at 1479-80.
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best carry out the purpose of the statute, a quest that even asks
what the drafters should have intended, assuming they were
reasonable people acting in good faith. 2 '
Theories vary in their justification for licensing courts to
become involved in determining the meaning of statutes. Those
that argue for greater judicial involvement tend to have in
common the pursuit of a republican ideal where the court's participation in constructing a legal framework can adjust for procedural defects that result from the compromises inherent in
the political process and the oversights of legislatures that may
exclude some interests or disregard the public good.'2 9
Pragmatism is a hybrid approach that sees courts inevitably immersed in value-based decisionmaking and doubts the
abilities of courts to engage in formalistic approaches. Thus, it
attempts to glean useful techniques from the other interpretive
approaches without being confined by the doctrinal sideboards
that have been constructed to define any one of them.' 30 The
pragmatist draws on the various approaches, weighing multiple
perspectives and values
as necessary to make the law fit with
13
contemporary norms.
Some observers have classified members of the Rehnquist
Court as "textualists" or originalists."2 My task is not to test
this judgment generally but to determine if the Court as a
whole, given the decisions reached by various majorities, appears to be following a particular approach to interpretation in
Indian cases. To the extent that it fails to appreciate the essen-

128. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 137480 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also POPKIN,
supra note 125, at 106-08.
129. POPKIN, supra note 125, at 159-69.
130. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword, Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 62-65 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 321, 323-24 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation].
131. See Eskridge, supra note 127, at 1496-97.
132. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, PluralistTheory, and the Interpretationof Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 624-25 (1994)
(categorizing Chief Justice Rehnquist as an originalist and Justice Scalia as a
textualist); Richard B. Saphire, ConstitutionalPredispositions,23 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 277, 281-85 (1998) (marking Justice Scalia as a "textualist" with respect to statutory interpretation); Nicholas S. Zeppos, ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
The Two Faces of Ultra-Pluralism,and the OriginalistFallacy, 25 RUTGERS
L.J. 679, 688-97 (1994) (comparing Justice Rehnquist's originalism with Justice Scalia's textualism).
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tially constitutional roots of the nation's arrangement with
tribes, the Court's subjectivist approach in Indian law is contrary to originalism. Thus, I conclude in the following discussion that, in Indian law, the Court has been engaged in a
search for meaning that involves it in a hands-on project of
finding legislative purpose and doing what the Justices believe
to be best under the circumstances. In that context, I find the
most troubling aspect of the inquiry to be the importation of
current social values, an essentially ethnocentric enterprise
that challenges even the wisest judge.
A. TEXTUALISM, ORIGINALISM, AND INDIAN LAW
An originalist would adhere to the foundational Indian law
cases and, absent clear textual treatment in congressional legislation, resist the temptation to fill in gaps or introduce the
judge's own preferences to redefine the historic political arrangement between tribes and the United States.'3 3 As should
be clear from this Article and my earlier analysis of the Supreme Court's Indian cases,3 4 this is not the Rehnquist Court's
approach. The Court regularly forges new rules and rarely
cites or is encumbered by established precedent in the area.
Perhaps more surprising than the Court's abandonment of
precedent and willingness to fill legislative gaps is its unawareness, or unwillingness to confront, the original understandings of the Framers concerning the place of Indians in the
constitutional order. The Rehnquist Court has not examined
the Framers' original intent that the Commerce Clause would
be the defining constitutional provision for the place of tribes in
the federal system. 3 ' Nor has it been moved to parse applicable laws and treaties with care to see if they evince an intent to
depart from the constitutionally based premise for autonomous
tribal governance of reservations. When it has gotten into detailed analysis of statutes, the Court has called on a variety of
extraneous sources to conjure up the mindset of legislators, and
even the attitudes of the public, in the eras when treaties were
negotiated and statutes passed. This is especially evident in
the reservation diminishment cases that construe ancient legislation as stripping tribes of their jurisdiction over large areas of
land that had been opened up to non-Indian settlement in the
133. See supra Part I.
134. See Getches, supra note 2; supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
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allotment era of the late nineteenth century. 1 6 The evidence
cited to support such constructions has included not only
whether the tribe agreed to accept money for the lands it gave
up, 137 but also statements from officials in the Indian Service,'38
newspaper articles after the legislation was passed,"19 subsequent events,'40 and even present-day demographics of the reservation in question.'
Canons of construction in Indian law
require that ambiguities be resolved in favor of Indian parties
who typically were at a disadvantage in the negotiation or

136. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333
(1998) (holding that Congress intended to diminish the Yankton Sioux Reservation in the 1894 Surplus Land Act and therefore the tribe lacked jurisdiction
over non-Indian land); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421-22 (1994) (holding
that Congress had diminished the reservation and therefore Utah courts had
jurisdiction over an Indian defendant); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S.
679, 687 (1993) (holding that federal statutes abrogated the treaty right of the
tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on reservation lands acquired for a reservoir project). The diminishment cases are discussed in
Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's JudicialReluctance to Allow Tribal
Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography and The Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 786-803
(1996) and Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judicial,as Opposed to Legislative,Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393, 396-408 (1995).
137. See Hagan,510 U.S. at 412.
138. See Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 352. Commissioner Cole, the
government negotiator, told the tribe that it "must break down the barriers
and invite the white man with all the elements of civilization," which the
Court viewed as evidence of diminishment. Id.; see Hagen, 510 U.S. at 417
(citing Indian Inspector James McLaughlin's "picturesque" speech to the Indians that the 1904 Act "will pull up the nails" of the reservation).
139. See DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 433-34 (1975)
(quoting an "Indian spokesman" in The Minneapolis Tribune agreeing to government plans to open the reservation). This approach actually began before
the Rehnquist Court, although it was tempered by the application of canons of
construction wherever the court found ambiguity. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465
U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-87
(1977); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446-47.
140. See Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 357 (citing South Dakota's assumption of jurisdiction over the territory almost immediately after the 1894
Act, in addition to evidence that the tribe had only recently tried to exercise
control over nontrust lands).
141. See id. at 356-57 (finding that despite recent increases in the Indian
population and trust land, the area is predominantly non-Indian, "with only a
few surviving pockets of Indian allotments," signifying a diminished reservation); Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421 (stating that the current population is almost
85% non-Indian and tribal headquarters are located on trust land, which with
the jurisdictional history was a "practical acknowledgment" that the reservation was diminished). The diminishment cases are perceptively discussed in
Frickey, supra note 36, at 17-27.
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drafting process, 4 2 but these canons have been all but abandoned by the Rehnquist Court, usually through a declaration
that there is no true ambiguity. 4 '
B. CONTEXT AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
The Rehnquist Court seems to be interested in considering
and weighing tribal rights in the context of modern circumstances. Interpretive approaches other than textualism all tend
to contextualize the search for meaning, but they vary in the
degree to which they allow a judge to inteiject current values
and notions of public interest into the process. The approach
least hindered by doctrine is pragmatism, which encourages
the judge to arrive at a decision that weaves together the best
of each interpretive approach. At the end of the day, the result
should make sense in terms of society's current values.' Advocates of this approach believe that "statutory interpretation
involves creative policymaking by judges." 45 And there is the
rub: Pragmatism assumes a judiciary that is not only willing
and intellectually equipped to integrate techniques of interpretation, but also capable of making value-laden choices with full
sensitivity to the cultural milieu that will be affected by their
law-giving. Ideally, the "context" of the decision would be fully
appreciated and understood by the wise judge who employs
practical reasoning, but success in Indian law depends on un142. See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 46-52; Judith V. Royster, Of Surplus
Lands and Landfills: The Case of the Yankton Sioux, 43 S.D. L. REV. 283, 307
(1998).
143. E.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 349 ("The principle according to
which ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of Indian tribes is not, however,
'a license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and Congressional intent.'")
(quoting DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447). In Hagen, the Court, after reciting the
canons, refused to apply them because it asserted that the words "restored to
the public domain," which had been variously interpreted by lower courts,
were unambiguous. 510 U.S. at 414-15. Justices Blackmun and Souter wrote
in the dissent that "[a]lthough the majority purports to apply these canons in
principle ... it ignores them in practice, resolving every ambiguity... in favor
of the State." Id. at 424; see also Getches, supra note 2, at 1620-22; Royster,
supra note 142, at 308 ("The Court will recite the canons, state that they apply, and then interpret the treaty or statute at issue to find that no ambiguity
exists.").
144. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation,supra note 130, at
345-62 (describing "practical reasoning" as an approach that eschews objectivist theories in favor of a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning, seeking
contextual justification for the best legal answer among the potential alternatives).
145. Id. at 345.
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derstanding essentially alien concepts that may defy the vernacular of Anglo-American law. Professor Frickey, one of the
leading proponents of practical reasoning and also an Indian
law scholar, has recognized that there are significant, perhaps
insuperable, barriers to the kind of dialogue that is necessary
for a robust, thoroughgoing consideration of all the factors, values, and traditions that are fundamental to practical reasoning
in an Indian law context.'4 6
First, courts are challenged to comprehend the broader legal context of Indian cases-that tribes constitute a class of
sovereigns under a legal tradition that pre-dates the founding
of the nation, and that this tradition was recognized in the
Constitution and has been perpetuated by the political
branches for most of the nation's history. The interpretive
technique of pragmatism invites courts to look behind foundational concepts. A judge who is dubious about how the traditions of Indian law fit into the nation's constitutional framework in today's world might indulge in the idea that Indians
are another minority group to be woven into the social fabric
and ask whether Indian law should be revamped. Given the
difficulty of achieving a full understanding of the consequences
of a decision when viewed through the lens of a single Indian
case, however, resort to a foundational approach seems more
apt. Thus, even a "pragmatist" might concede, if not embrace,
the importance of maintaining a distinct body of Indian law. In
nearly all Indian cases until the mid-1980s the Supreme Court
47
did not question or depart from this traditional approach.
Second, because of the particularized legal framework of
Indian cases, courts may confront a cultural divide as they apply Indian law to determine "the best legal answer" in specific
fact situations. Although the nine Justices, and to some extent
other federal judges, represent a privileged slice of society

146. See Frickey, supra note 36, at 58-64 (recognizing that the Court actually does follow practical reasoning but does it in a careless or thoughtless and
non-dialogic way); Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137,
1230 n.435 (1990) [hereinafter Frickey, CongressionalIntent] (noting the virtual impossibility of trying to discuss the actual nature of tribes and Indianness in the framework ofAnglo-American legal constructs).
147. But see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981), Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville IndianReservation, 447 U.S. 134,
158-59 (1980), and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212
(1978), which were "[plivotal [diecisions" during the modem era for the Court's
later "[rietreat from [f]oundation [pirinciples." Getches, supra note 2, at 1595.
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heavily insulated from the realities of average American life,
they at least share values and experiences that equip them for
the interpretive tasks of applying and adapting language to
situations presented by cases arising in the mainstream of
American society. Indian law, by contrast, operates on people
distinguished by their cultures and on unique institutions
shaped by different histories.
An open-minded judge, conscious of latent prejudices, can
sometimes empathize with a person disadvantaged by society's
exclusion or disenfranchisement, but a new dimension is added
when the "different" claimant or class asserts the right to remain different. Thus, it may be easier for a panel of elite, predominately white male lawyers14 to understand the problem of
employment discrimination against an African-American single
mother whose goal is to come closer to the mainstream than it
is for the panel to appreciate the importance of cultural survival that depends on tribal traditions and autonomy that
would allow killing eagles for ceremonial purposes.
Arguing that, in Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall was effectively engaged in dynamic interpretation, Professor Frickey
has written that "problems of federal Indian law are better understood and analyzed through a contextually enriched framework built on the traditions established by Chief Justice Marshall than through the articulation of foundational rules." 49

148. "When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to... reflect[] the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also THE SUPREME COURT A TO Z 32-36 (Kenneth Jost ed., 2d ed.
1998) (discussing the Court's composition).
149. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, supra note 146, at 1142. Frickey views
Marshall's role in the Cherokee cases as "critically balancing the interests of
the colonizing government and the victims of colonization." Id. at 1228. He
argues that Marshall reached his result by mediating the tensions created by
a thorny local political situation, troubling normative concerns, and incomplete positive law. Id. at 1228-30. Another perspective is that the decision
was just a strategic means to accomplish Marshall's federalist ends. See
Getches, supra note 2, at 1582; Richard A. Monette, A New Federalismfor Indian Tribes: The RelationshipBetween the United States and Tribes in Light of
Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 638
(1994). I believe that the best reading of the case, however, is that Marshall
was simply doing what he said he was doing: recognizing the preemptive force
of the Cherokee treaties and the Non-intercourse Act, and applying the Commerce Clause as the Framers intended it to be applied. See Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) ("If the review which has been taken
be correct, and we think it is, the acts of Georgia are repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.").
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He has suggested that it should be the mission of the Court in
Indian law to "accommodate our colonial heritage with the human values of the late twentieth century.""' Contextualizing
meaning in Indian law is essentially what the Supreme Court
has been doing in its recent cases dealing with tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and it is what enables a subjectivist approach. Indeed, Frickey agrees that the Court's recent opinions
in Indian law "represent dynamic interpretation to the core."'
Justice Scalia wrote a manifesto for using dynamic interpretation in Indian cases in a private memo describing the Court's
role as a quest "to discern what the current state of affairs
ought to be by taking into account all legislation, and the congressional 'expectations' that it reflects, down to the present

day."152
That a court can, or should, be licensed to read broad policy
into a statute in order to accommodate a panoply of considerations, while ensuring that the result makes sense as the court
views the particular case, may have superficial appeal. It
surely depends on a high-minded neutrality of judges entrusted
with the task. In any event, the value of any interpretive
method varies according to its utility, appropriateness, and the
results it produces in different areas of the law.'53 Pragmatism
150. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, supra note 146, at 1239.
151. Frickey, supra note 36, at 63. He asserts that the flaw in the Court's
application of pragmatism has been that it has uncritically applied values,
failing to test whether they "can withstand normative reassessment." Id. at
64; see also Alfred L. Brophy, Foreword, New Directions in Native American
Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 1, 2 n.8 (1998) (claiming that departures from
foundational principles "may represent the emergence of 'practical reasoning,"
citing as examples the Court's decisions in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261 (1997) and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978)).
152. Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (Apr. 4, 1990) (on file with the author). For a discussion of the memorandum, see Frickey, supra note 36, at 62-63, and Getches, supra note 2, at
1575-76.
153. It seems obvious that some interpretive methods are more appropriate
in some areas than in others. See HETZEL ET AL., supra note 125, at 388 ("No
single technique of statutory interpretation will be adequate to resolve all
types of interpretation problems."); POPKIN, supra note 125, at 177
("[D]ifferent statutes have different value implications and institutional settings, which call for different interpretive approaches. The major challenge for
modem statutory interpretation is to work out the best approach for interpreting statutes in different areas of the law... ."). Professor Robert Rasmussen
questions the preoccupation of scholarly inquiry with assessing interpretive
processes rather than focusing on whether the results produced by different
interpretive methods lead to better overall consequences for the particular
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may have appeal in areas of private law or in the realm of regulatory law, where application of the law sensitive to context
may be particularly welcome; but in fields where the interpretive result amounts to national policy, its germination in the
context of an individual case is questionable."' When the sub-

ject matter is, for instance, international relations, a dynamic
judicial process may be less appropriate because the "practical"
judgments may be fundamentally political.' 55 In these circumstances, foundational approaches and canons may be more

principled.
Given the Commerce Clause's express delegation to Congress of responsibility for Indian affairs, deference to Congress
is even more appropriate than in international relations where
there is not a clear-cut constitutional assignment of responsibility for establishing national policy. 15 6 The basics of federal Indian law-the notion that tribes lack the capacity to deal with
other nations, but that their internal affairs or lands are not
subject to the authority of the states, and that they stand in a
fiduciary relationship with the federal government-constitute
entrenched national policy.'57 Hence, there is a historical basis
field of law. He makes the case that, in the field of bankruptcy law, abandoning the Court's essentially textual approach in favor of dynamic interpretation
would make little difference. Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and
Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U.
L.Q. 535, 597 (1993).
154. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962) (finding that political
question analysis must be on a case-by-case basis where each question presented must be analyzed "in terms of ... its management by the political
branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling... and of the possible consequences ofjudicial action").
155. Some, but not all, controversies involving foreign relations lie beyond
judicial competence. Compare Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1981) (stating that the field of international relations, "'with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems," is "rarely proper ... for judicial interven-

tion" and thus these matters are 'exclusively entrusted to the political
branches'") (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp. 299 U.S. 304,
319 (1936), and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)), with
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-37 (1964) (claiming
that the application of the act-of-state doctrine, preventing U.S. courts from
judging public acts of another sovereign, is based on factors like the sensitivity
of political judgments touching on social and economic ideology, the risk of
piecemeal decisions, and the possibility that political branches consciously
chose not to express an official position).
156. The Constitution delegates the role of negotiating treaties to the executive but requires senatorial ratification. See U.S. CONST.art. II, § 2. The
President also represents the United States in foreign relations by appointing,
id., and receiving ambassadors, id. § 3.
157.

See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 21, at 1-6; see also COHEN, supra note
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for a rule of judicial deference. 158
Assuming pragmatism has great value for the field of interpretation generally,'59 its limits may be illuminated in the
context of Indian law, just as so many other ostensibly good
ideas and policies have tested their elasticity in Indian law.
Besides employing an individual case as the fulcrum for policymaking in Indian affairs, contextualization can demand profoundly difficult judgments in Indian cases where the situintercultural
risks
nature of interpretation
ational
misunderstanding. It may be impossible for a court to contextualize an Indian case with full comprehension of the nature of
tribalism and its value in a plural society. The wider the divide
between judicial life experience and the particular issue raised
by a case, the less reliable the judge will be as an interpreter
charged with integrating the relevant social and cultural values to guide decisioumaking.
To conclude that the present Court decides Indian law
cases according to a practical reasoning approach does not reveal what moves the Justices to consider a result to be the
"best" from "among the potential alternatives." 6 ' The cases decided by the Court in a variety of fields may provide a window
to the Court's attitudes that shape these judgments.

1, at 207-28. If national Indian policy and the relationship with tribes are to
be "liberated" from congressional oversight and allowed to evolve according to
a case-by-case interpretation by the courts, the political and legal traditions of
the nation would seem to require some indication from Congress that it intended to relinquish its historic control.
158. E.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913) (asserting that
"it is the rule of this court to follow [the action of] the executive and other political departments of the [glovernment, whose more special duty it is to determine such affairs" as the status of Pueblo peoples) (quoting United States
v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407,419 (1865)).
159. I confess skepticism about most judges' capacity to bring to their job
the level of objectivity, humility, and detachment needed for pragmatism to
succeed. It is one thing to ask courts consciously to detach themselves from
cases, to presume innocence, or to ignore illegally obtained evidence. Practical
reasoning demands even more: that judges elevate their objectivity to be able
to overcome their unconscious motives and biases based in experiences and
mores. Judges have to remain detached while they candidly make multiple,
subtle value judgements that go into weighing all the factors that may bear on
potentially applicable law to come up with the "best" legal meaning under the
circumstances of the case. The kind of perfection in analysis and objectivity
that this demands is rare, even among judges.
160. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation,supra note 130, at 322
n.3.
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VI. ATTITUDES AND VALUES: DECISIONS IN OTHER
FIELDS AS A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE
REHNQUIST COURT'S INDIAN LAW
If the Court's approach to interpretation in Indian law is
highly contextualized, and if the Court has no clear Indian law
agenda, it may be necessary to look to the directions the Court
is taking in other fields to find the values and attitudes that influence the Court's decisions. Identifying those directions and
the underlying values may help predict the course of Indian
law. Thus, I have searched the available scholarship on the
Court's work in all fields of law to discern attitudes that explain the Court's work.
Some commentators attempt to squeeze the Court's decisions into "liberal" and "conservative" boxes and others analyze
the orientation or character of particular Justices. More useful,
however, are reviews of the results in decisions in all fields that
suggest pervasive values and attitudes. I conclude that the
Court, with little dissent, is using Indian law merely as a forum
to express these attitudes of majorities of the Justices, attitudes that are likely to chart the future course of Indian law.''
A. CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL LABELING
The most frequent attempts at generalization are those
that try to classify the Court and individual Justices as "conservative" and "liberal." Commentators often conclude that the
Rehnquist Court is "conservative" or focus on whether some
Justices are as "conservative" as the Presidents who appointed
them hoped they would be.' 62
161. See infra Conclusion.
162. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Is the Rehnquist Court Really That
Conservative?: An Analysis of the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 987,
987 (1993) (finding that during the 1991-92 Term, the Court "consistently accept[ed] and endors[ed] conservative views"); M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan, Federalismand Separationof Powerson a "Conservative"Court: Currents
and Cross-Currentsfrom Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1443,
1443-45 (1990) (exploring the differences and similarities "within the emerging 'conservative bloc' on the current Supreme Court," using Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia as test subjects); Lisa R. Graves, Looking
Back, Looking Ahead: Justice O'Connor,Ideology, and the Advice and Consent
Process, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 171-72 (1993) (arguing in favor of
stronger ideological review of Supreme Court nominees); Staci Rosche, How
Conservative is the Rehnquist Court? Three Issues, One Answer, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2685, 2685-86 (1997) (comparing the Court's decisions during the Burger Court, 1981-85, with those of the Rehnquist Court, 1991-95); Kathleen M.
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Conservative-liberal labeling is imprecise, even confusing,
because it requires the terms to be re-defined in light of contemporary political agendas, rather than according to usages of
the terms in traditional political philosophy or interpretive approaches.163 Moreover, when applied to the Court as a whole,
labels must be qualified by saying that some of the Justices are
steadfastly conservative while others are moderate, or by dividing the Court into "blocs."" After such qualifications, considerable scholarly ink is spent wondering what it means when
Justices stray from their assigned label or bloc.
By categorizing as "conservative" outcomes that favor
states' rights, property rights, and executive power, while disfavoring rights of criminal defendants and access to courts, Erwin Chemerinsky has 65viewed the Rehnquist Court as being
"solidly conservative."'
He explains that a few celebrated
Sullivan, The Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA L. REV. 743, 744
(1998) (examining "institutional, jurisprudential, and ideological factors" to
explain "the surprising moderation of Justices predicted to be conservative").
Some studies find a high degree of correlation among the votes of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor, who typically vote to
support a suite of outcomes favored by today's so-called political conservative.
See Robert H. Smith, Uncoupling The "CentristBloc"--An EmpiricalAnalysis
of the Thesis of a Dominant, Moderate Bloc on the United States Supreme
Court, 62 TENN. L. REv. 1, 4-6, 31-33, 38 (1994). In the case of the first three,
the support is almost unflagging, while the latter two have become less predictable in recent years, sparking debate over whether a moderate bloc holds
the balance of power. Id. at 1; see also FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 81, at 145-46
(concluding that a centrist coalition of Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Souter is capable of invoking moderation to prevent "superconservatism" on
the Court); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDs 293 (1995) (concluding that
the prevailing ethos of the Court is moderation, and that some Justices, notably Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, were responsible for de-railing a conservative revolution); cf Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most DangerousJustice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S.CAL. L. REv. 63, 9095 (1996) (arguing that the Justices with the greatest influence on outcomes
were Kennedy during the 1994 Term and Ginsburg during the 1995 Term).
163. The labels, of course, have virtually nothing to do with dictionary
definitions, issues of restraint versus activism, or the meanings of classical
terms used in political philosophy. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Philosophical
Gulfon the Rehnquist Court, 29 RuTGERS L.J. 1, 2-6 (1997) (discussing the different philosophical and political meanings of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" when attributed to the Supreme Court).
164. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 162, at 293; Smith, supra note 162, at 4-7.
Friedelbaum states that "it should not be assumed that anything akin to a
solid voting bloc categorically describes this or any other court."
FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 81, at xiv.
165. Chemerinsky, supra note 162, at 988 (refuting a "popular misconception that the 1991-92 Term demonstrate[d] that the Rehnquist Court [was] not
...conservative").
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cases, like Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'66 which do not fulfill
the agenda of conservative politicians who favor overruling Roe
v. Wade,'67 neither mean that the Court is not conservative nor
that the Court's jurisprudence is driven
by a moderate center
68
as many observers have suggested.1
The most thorough, Justice-by-Justice analysis of the
Rehnquist Court has been produced by Stephen Gottlieb. 69 He
demonstrates that conservative-liberal groupings are crude
and misleading. While a majority of the Justices typically fulfill the expectations of people who adhere to the "conservative"
political agenda, they do not fit any single conservative tradi"' but have as their common theme moral absolutism. 7
tion, 70
'
The other Justices, of whom some or all often vote opposite to
the "conservative" majority, can best be grouped under the rubric of utilitarianism. 7 2 Gottlieb opines that "[there are no
liberals on this Court,"' and shows that the Justices most often in the minority employ a diverse set of values to balance or
compare the interests of mass society with individual rights.'7 4
He says that "[talk of a center on the Court is almost quixotic." 75

Kathleen Sullivan explains the Court's departures from
popular conceptions of conservatism in a handful of cases by
elaborating on the different strands of conservatism that can be
superimposed on a particular case. 76 She agrees that the "center" is not in control. For instance, a conservative could support Casey, and refuse to overrule Roe, on grounds of judicial
restraint and stare decisis. Although the suggestion of a centrist ballast within the Rehnquist Court now seems question-

166. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
167. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
168. Chemerinsky, supra note 162, at 1000-03.
169. GOTTLIEB, supra note 124.
170. Id. at 193.
171. Id. at 50.
172. Id. at 147.
173. Id. at 197, 194.
174. Id. at 161-63; see also id. at 180 (finding Souter essentially a "conservative," based on his cautious approach, but contrasting him with the "more
radical conservatives").
175. Id. at 194.
176. See Sullivan, supra note 162, at 758 (noting the complexity inherent in
defining constitutional conservatism and discussing the institutional, jurisprudential, and ideological factors that explain the surprising moderation of
Justices predicted to be conservative).
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able, 77 it appears that individual Justices willing to exercise
independence
in voting have had tremendous influence in close
178
cases.

As interesting as these studies may be, any attempt to
categorize the Court requires multiple qualifications and explanations. Not only are there various definitions of liberal and
conservative to choose from, but none of them was invented to
describe this Court's, or any Justice's, approach. Instead, the
entire exercise is encumbered by definitions that, even if clearly
understood, were contrived to describe positions or philosophies
that emerged from other institutions or other eras. Such difficulty trying to cabin the Court within existing classifications
argues for constructing new classifications just as one would in
biology if a new species or sub-species were discovered or in
philosophy or art if a new school of thought or practice
emerged. It would make more sense to try to start with what
the Court is actually doing and then find appropriate descriptors for the common themes or direction of the Court's decisions. In any event, liberal-conservative classifications have
little predictive value in Indian law where the issues simply do
not fit neatly into such boxes.
It is questionable, however, whether any identifiable philosophy could emerge from the collective work of the Court.
Some experts, after examining decisions of the Court, conclude
that it is "pledged to no abiding ideological agenda that can be
regarded as overweening."'79 Theories that the Court has a focused philosophy tend to be unhelpful because they are fraught
with exceptions and because most decisions necessarily involve
dilution and accommodation among the values and philosophies held individually and with varying degrees of passion by
the Justices.
B. UNDERSTANDING INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES

Some scholars attribute judicial decisions to the fulfillment
177. See Smith, supra note 162, at 69 ("[Clentrists were not as influential
(frequency of voting with the majority), not as moderate... (frequency of voting for or against ideological positions), and not as cohesive (frequency of
agreeing in outcomes and joining in opinions with each other) as they have
been characterized.").
178. See Lynn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for
Common Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187,
207-08 (1996); Edelman & Chen, supra note 162, at 96-98.
179. FRIEDELBAUM, supra note 81, at 145.
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of political or personal predilections of the Justices.8 ° Analyses
of individual Justices, to determine their philosophical orientation and preferences, may be more enlightening than looking at
the Court as a whole because the Court, after all, is made up of
individuals with complex sets of values.
Consider Professor Merrill's assessment that Chief Justice
Rehnquist is best described as an "ultrapluralist" based on his
performance in cases in all fields.' 8 ' An ultrapluralist puts
faith in the legislative branch to mediate among conflicting interests, is skeptical about the role of the judiciary to make
value-based choices, and favors state and local governments
over the federal establishment. 18 2 When called on to interpret
the law, the ultrapluralist follows originalism."'8
Despite Merrill's tightly reasoned and documented argument, the conclusion does not seem to comport with the
Rehnquist Court's work in Indian law. That work is characterized by a heightened role for the judiciary, a retreat from deference to Congress, and a willingness to fulfill current expectations of non-Indians rather than adhering to the original
arrangements between tribes and the nation. And one would
think that faith in the government closest to the people being
governed might argue in favor of tribal governments, but
Rehnquist has not approached Indian cases with the notion
that tribes resemble the kinds of governments that ought to be
able to exercise localized self-determination over their territory.
Instead of deference to local control, "hostility is palpable" in
his approach to Indian sovereignty cases."' Rehnquist, the ul180. E.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, The Supreme Court: from Warren to Burger,in
THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, 179 (Anthony King ed., 1978). See
generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JuDICIAL TRADITION (1976).
181. Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, PluralistTheory, and the
Interpretationof Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 621 (1994) ("Chief Justice
Rehnquist is far more internally consistent than most Supreme Court Justices, and.., the best predictor of his behavior is not the platforms of the Republican Party but an implicit theory of the political system and of the proper
role of the judiciary within it.").
182. Id. at 638-41.
183. Id. The predictive value of these generalizations is doubtful. Professor Nicholas Zeppos questions whether Merrilrs comparison of Rehnquist and
Scalia, resulting in a bright contrast between their approaches to statutory
interpretation, really matters. Zeppos, supra note 132, at 689. He argues that
because the two Justices agree in 92% of all statutory cases, the methodological cleavages are either inconsequential or not credible. Id.
184. GOTTLIEB, supra note 124, at 77 (stating that if Rehnquist really believes "that deference to local homogeneous groups strengthens the moral fabric," he "ought to support the authority of... Indian tribes"). Although most
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trapluralist, favors application of canons of construction that
require a clear congressional statement to overcome the presumption against waiver of a state's sovereign immunity or
preemption of state and local regulation.1 85 He does not favor,
however, application of canons that require a clear congressional action to abrogate tribal rights and powers.8 6 Perhaps
these apparent inconsistencies can be attributed to the ultrapluralist's over-riding preference for states' rights that are often involved in Indian cases. Yet, categorizing Chief Justice
Rehnquist as an ultrapluralist sheds little light on the question
of where the Court is headed in Indian law.
Articles on some of the Justices describe various aspects of
their backgrounds, approaches, and characters, but they vary
in approach and depth.'87 In addition, some Justices have not
of his opinions and votes belie it, Rehnquist has indicated a basic understanding of tribal sovereignty. In his first Indian opinion, he wrote that tribes possess "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). The foundational cases,
Rehnquist wrote, "establish... that Indian tribes within Indian country' are a
good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations.'" Id.
185. Merrill, supra note 181, at 645-46.
186. Rehnquist has rarely applied the canons of construction in Indian law.
E.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 218
(1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the majority's reliance on
the canon of resolving ambiguities in favor of the Indians is "strained, indeed"); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 110 (1993) (finding the petitioner's
reliance on general canons "of Indian law unavailing"). Moreover, he favors an
approach that produces a result that comports with expectations of legislatures and affected parties down to the present day. E.g., Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians,526 U.S. at 218 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("mhe settled
expectation of the United States was that the 1850 Executive Order had terminated the hunting rights of the Chippewa."); Negonsott, 507 U.S. at 107
('Thus, the Kansas Act was designed to 'merely confirm a relationship which
the State has willingly assumed, which the Indians have willingly accepted,
and which has produced successful results, over a considerable period of
years ... .'") (quoting H. R. REP. No. 1999, at 5 (1940); S. REP. NO. 1523, at 5
(1940)); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604-05 (1977) ("The longstanding assumption ofjurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90%
non-Indian... has created justifiable expectations which should not be upset
by so strained a reading of the Acts of Congress .... ").
187. See, e.g., Joyce A. Baugh & Christopher E. Smith, Doubting Thomas:
Confirmation Veracity Meets PerformanceReality, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 455,
495 (1996) ("Thomas's views in Supreme Court cases have been consistent
with his controversial pre-Court speeches and writings rather than with the
disclaimers and explanations he presented during his confirmation hearings."); Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 162, at 1443 ("[The] differences in the
approaches to federalism and separation [of powers] taken by Justices
O'Connor and Scalia are explained, in part, by differences in their backgrounds and methods of constitutional interpretation."); Lisa R. Graves, Look-
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yet been the subjects of much individual scrutiny. Stephen
Gottlieb has produced an analysis of each of the nine Justices'
philosophical orientations. 8 ' Nevertheless, it furnishes few direct explanations that address the Indian cases. The study
notes Chief Justice Rehnquist's record of opposing tribal autonomy in spite of his self-proclaimed commitment to local control,18 9 and Thomas's failure to generalize his "willing[ness] to
accept single-race institutions.., into support for ethnic selfdetermination,... as he makes clear by his consistent denial of
Indian claims."'90 Analyzing the other Justices is no less enigmatic. Gottlieb says that although Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer are likely to array against majority positions on the
Court, they are "least unified with respect to aliens and Native
Americans," and thus often join majorities against Indians.' 9 '
Although it might be interesting to have a better understanding of any of the Justices' specific views on Indian law in order
to predict that Justice's orientation as a potential tiebreaker in
close cases, close cases have been infrequent in the Rehnquist
Court's Indian law decisions. 92
ing Back, Looking Ahead: Justice O'Connor,Ideology, and the Advice and Consent Process, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLy 121, 124 (1993) ("Justice O'Connor
exemplifies how all Justices come to the Court with some form of judicial philosophy and political ideology that significantly affects their approaches to
cases."); Zeppos, supra note 132, at 689 ("Chief Justice Rehnquist rarely uses
originalist methodology to reach a surprisingly liberal result. Justice Scalia,
however, will occasionally live with the liberal consequences of his textualism.").
188. GOTTLIEB,supra note 124.
189. See supranote 184 and accompanying text.
190. GOrLIEB, supra note 124, at 115.
191. See id. at 171.
192. The Rehnquist Court has decided only four Indian cases by a 5-4 vote.
Idaho v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2135 (2001); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521
U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). From 19581986 there were only two 5-4 decisions. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v.
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9 (1985); Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State
Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); cf. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985) (a 5-3 decision); United States v.
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (a 5-3 decision).
If one were to analyze the power of particular Justices in Indian cases
based on the criteria of Professors Edelman and Chen, supra note 162,
Rehnquist and O'Connor would emerge as especially influential. O'Connor is
important because she is usually in the majority when the Court's Indian decisions are closely divided, although she dissented in California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (a 6-3 decision). Justice
O'Connor also has joined in only three partial dissents. Arizona v. California,
120 S.Ct. 2304 (2000); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998);
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The Gottlieb and Merrill studies illustrate that generalizations that may otherwise aptly explain Justices' overall approaches may not accurately describe or explain their approaches to Indian law.'9 3
VII. COURT DECISIONS REFLECT BROAD, COLLECTIVE
ATTITUDES OF MAJORITIES
A more promising approach may be to search the Court's
decisions in all types of cases for strong, crosscutting trends in
the outcomes. If the Court's decisions coalesce into a collective
expression of its orientation toward particular issues that transcend the subject matter of cases, and if these attitudes comport with the Rehnquist Court's Indian law decisions, they may
indicate the directions the Court will take in future cases in the
field.'94 To the extent that such issues are raised in Indian
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). Rehnquist has
been in the minority on an Indian decision only three times since he became
Chief Justice. Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2135 (2001); Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172; Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). Scalia and Thomas also have dissented only three
times each in Indian cases. Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2135 (2001)
(Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting); Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U.S. 172 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg.
Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians,480 U.S. 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It has been Rehnquist's
prerogative as Chief, however, to select the Justice to write the opinions in all
the cases in which he was in the majority, or 92% of the Indian cases. The author calculated this figure based on data compiled from his analysis of the Indian law cases.
193. Other scholars argue that there may be institutional factors (e.g.,
rules, voting, interaction of the members' different approaches, assignment of
opinion-writing, and so forth) that prevail over individual Justices' preferences
and philosophies and account better for outcomes. See discussion infra at
notes 251-57.
See generally SUPREME COURT DEcISION-MAKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds.,
1999); THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
INTERPRETATIONS (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999); Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, & William J. Dixon, The Supreme Court and Criminal Justice Disputes:A Neo-Institutional Perspective, 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 825
(1989).
194. I borrow terminology here from Rohde and Spaeth whose "attitudinal
model" has been used to show empirically that the Justices' votes can be predicted based on their policy preferences. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 134-57 (1976). They posit that
the most important determinants of decisions are the collective and individual
values and attitudes of members of the Court. Id.; see also JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 6473 (1993).
The model is based on the idea that it is possible to identify "atti-
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cases, or to the extent that the Justices believe that those issues and the underlying values are implicated, the Justices' attitudes may be the primary determinant of future outcomes.
Starting with this hypothesis, I sought out evidence. Constitutional experts have reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions in diverse fields with varying degrees of supporting
data.195 I reviewed their analyses of outcomes and the language
of several opinions, together with statistics compiled either as a
part of those analyses or as separate tabulations.'96 This
method led to three surprisingly robust and discrete conclusions about the collective attitudes of the Rehnquist Court as
indicated by its decisions in all fields: The Court tends to disfavor claims of racial minorities, to protect the interests of states,
and to promote mainstream values. To the extent that these
attitudes are implicated in Indian cases, they are likely to determine the outcome, change Indian law, and reshape Indian
tudes," or sets of interrelated beliefs about the type of party and the central
legal issue in each case. An elaborate process is used to sort cases according to
the type of party and the situation in which the case arose. The issue areas
into which the cases are grouped then are assumed to exhibit interrelated sets
of attitudes or values that can be attributed to individual Justices. Published
research using the model is not sufficiently current to address the inquiry in
this Article. Moreover, the aggregations of preferences termed "values" that
Rohde and Spaeth identified (e.g., freedom, equality, libertarianism) were
generalized to a level that does not aid in predicting the outcome of Indian
cases.
I did not attempt to replicate or adapt the modeling exercise but was
inspired by it to search the multiple works of constitutional scholars analyzing
and tabulating results in Supreme Court cases and then to try to draw from
these analyses a set of "attitudes" that serve to predict outcomes based on past
outcomes in Rehnquist Court decisions.
195. See infra notes 197-257 and accompanying text; see also supra Part
VI.
196. Both the case analysis and the statistical methods have their frailties.
Even a painstaking study of opinions and their reasoning may not tell much
about how the Court will look on different facts in another time, let alone predict how the Court, or some majority of its members, will approach a case in
another field of law. Statistics are harvested from results and do not probe the
reasons for a decision. Indeed, the analytical method ultimately tells more
about outcome than about the rationale or philosophical underpinnings of a
decision, but the largely results-based studies of the hundreds of decisions of
this Court, a majority of whose members has been seated under the same
Chief Justice for more than a decade and all nine of whom have served together for over seven years, can yield some potentially reliable generalizations. If the statistics are overwhelming, commentators seem in agreement,
and a survey of the underlying cases gives no reason to doubt that there is a
trend, we can conclude that the information may be useful in identifying attitudes that will predict the direction of Indian law, provided it is information
that describes circumstances that are likely to arise in Indian litigation.
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policy, even if the Court is indifferent about Indian law as a
distinct field. One or more of these three clearly identifiable attitudes of the Rehnquist Court is at the core of virtually every
Indian case, given the facts and parties typically found in such
cases, so they offer valuable insights into the directions Indian
law will take if the Court stays its present course.
A. THE COURT DISFAVORS CLAIMS OF RACIAL MINORITIES
One scholar has summarized the Rehnquist Court's record
in cases involving claims of equal protection as follows: "[T]he
Court has tightened the restrictions on civil rights suits, limited affirmative action remedies, made it easier to challenge affirmative action and set aside programs for women and blacks,
reversed earlier desegregation decisions, and avoided expanding the net of equal protection... scrutiny traditionally
granted racial and gender discrimination cases."197
Almost every race-conscious remedial program has been rejected. 9 s This approach "functions to restrict the reach of legal
measures designed to actively intervene in racism" because it is
based on "the theory that the appropriate response to ongoing
racism is for the government and the law to refuse to recognize
race as a relevant category." 9 9 The "color-blind" approach, according to one observer, marks "a major shift away from the
Court's traditional concern for fairness and justice for racial
minorities." °0 The resulting rejection of programs that attempt
to reverse past patterns of racially disparate allocation of gov197. Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Dynamics and Determinants of Agenda
Change in the Rehnquist Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 251, 268-69 (Lee
Epstein ed., 1995).
198. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) (rejecting congressional re-districting undertaken to prevent unnecessary minimization of
districts with black majorities); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 204 (1995) (addressing set-aside programs benefiting minority contractors); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 76-77 (1995) (addressing programs to
induce white students to return to public schools).
199. Natasha L. Minsker, "I Have A Dream-NeverForget: When Rhetoric
Becomes Law, A Comparisonof the Jurisprudenceof Race in Germany and the
United States, 14 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 113, 115 (1998).
200. Parker, supra note 100, at 766. Professor Casebeer argues, "Rewriting
Brown to get rid of Court responsibility to end invidious subordination of current minorities by turning Brown into a demand for 'colorblindness' freezes
existing majority race use of law to preserve the majority's gains and exclusivity of geographical location." Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The PoliticalEconomy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial
Disappearingof the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAII L. REV. 247, 252
(2000).
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ernment-provided opportunities has been criticized as "an
enormous setback to minority efforts to achieve equal opportunity."2"' This theory of equality is especially destructive when
misapplied to laws relating to Indians. °2
A 1997 study compares the performance of the Rehnquist
and Burger Courts in several areas. °3 In the civil rights area,
the two Courts ruled in favor of the person alleging discrimination in about the same percentage of cases (Burger Court, 71%;
Rehnquist Court, 68%) but there was a major difference in
the way the Rehnquist Court treated racial discrimination as
opposed to non-race based claims of discrimination. In 64% of
the cases the Burger Court favored racial minorities compared
to the Rehnquist Court's rulings in favor of minorities in only
25% of the cases. °5 Moreover, the Rehnquist Court has accepted far fewer racial discrimination cases for review. 6
The same study points out that the statistics actually obscure the extent of differences between the two Courts.0 7 The
Burger Court, even when it did rule against a claim of discrimination, left the door open to circumstantial claims based
on de facto inequalities, while the Rehnquist Court has moved
toward requiring proof of discriminatory intent.0 ' Furthermore, the rulings of the Rehnquist Court sustaining discrimination claims have often been in cases brought by majority interests claiming they were burdened by programs that
benefited minorities.0 9 The Burger Court's decisions, however,
201. Parker, supra note 100, at 764.
202. See, e.g., Ann Tweedy, The Liberal ForcesDrivingthe Supreme Court's
Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J.
147, 214 (2000) ("While the Supreme Court's approach to Equal Protection
analysis is problematic for all subordinated groups, it is especially so for Indian tribes which were formerly protected from assimilation by a fairly robust
concept of tribal sovereignty.").
203. Rosche, supra note 162 (comparing the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
work in racial discrimination, free expression, and criminal law).
204. Id. at 2688-89.
205. Id. at 2689.
206. Id. at 2688-89. Of the 728 Burger Court decisions, 7.1% were discrimination cases; of the 448 Rehnquist Court decisions, only 5.1% were discrimination cases.
207. Id. at 2689-90.
208. Id. at 2695-98; see, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001);
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
209. See DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE
REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 454 (1992) (arguing that one of two "exceptions
to the general rule that individuals and their constitutional rights lose in the
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tended to be in cases involving attempts to redress the effects of
racial discrimination against minorities.2 1 ° In employment discrimination cases, the Burger Court ruled in favor of the claimants in a majority of the cases, while the Rehnquist Court "all
but abandoned race-based discrimination issues."2"1' In voting
rights cases, successful claims fell from 75% in the Burger
Court to 36% in the Rehnquist Court.212
B. THE COURT PROTECTS THE INTERESTS OF STATES
According to Professor Laurence Tribe, "'The most consistent commitment of the current [C]ourt is probably to a vision
of federalism that gives states considerably more autonomy and
protection from the national legislature than any [C1ourt in
decades has done."'213 This is borne out by an empirical study
of cases involving state interests such as Eleventh Amendment
immunity, state taxing authority, and treatment of Congress's
Commerce Clause power relative to state power. The study
concludes that "whether the state interest wins or loses on the
merits ... is a function of the degree to which the 'legitimate
activities of the states'... drive the controversy, encumbered
by neither the Supremacy Clause nor the national government's enumerated powers. " "' Moreover, the Court has elevated the states' right to "set their own rules" over an ideal of
"a nation in which its citizens had the same rights and liberties
wherever they resided."2 15
Rehnquist Court... involves white males who are the victims of 'affirmative
action'").
210. Rosche, supra note 162, at 2696-97.
211. Id. at 2698.
212. Id. at 2701.
213. John Aloysius Farrell, Scales of Justice: When the Supreme Court Tips
to the Left These Days, It is Often With the Help of Two Justices: New Hampshire'sDavid Souter and Harvard'sStephen Breyer, THE BOSTON GLOBE MAG.,
May 10, 1998, at 16, 18. But see Robert F. Nagel, JudicialPowerand the Restoration of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 52, 53-56
(2001) (arguing that the Court is not necessarily "strongly committed," id. at
54, to the restoration of states' rights and stating that "[flederalism... is a
constitutional principle singularly unsuited for judicial appreciation," id. at
56).
214. Drs. Bill Swinford & Eric N. Waltenburg, The Supreme Court and the
States: Do Lopez and Printz Represent a BroaderPro-State Movement?, 14 J.
L. & POL. 319, 321 (1998) (footnote omitted) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971)).
215. SAVAGE, supra note 209, at 455. The Court has even curtailed congressional regulation of patents by striking down a federal law allowing patent
infringement suits against states. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
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The conclusion that the Rehnquist Court prefers the interests of states has overwhelming statistical support. When a
state loses in a lower court and the Supreme Court accepts the
case, it reverses in favor of the state 93% of the time.21 By contrast, when the state wins below the Court reverses only 47% of
the time.217 It is interesting to look at the nature of these state
losses; several are in cases where states have enacted programs
such as racially composed congressional districts to comply
with federal mandates under the Voting Rights Act." 8
C. THE COURT FAVORS MAINSTREAM VALUES
Decisions in several fields of law indicate that the Court is
strongly inclined to follow what the Justices believe to be the
mainstream values of American society. A dedication to the
status quo, often exemplified by "traditional values," is a common theme that can be synthesized from the work of writers
who have proposed several different explanations for the
Court's decisions. For instance, some scholars argue that recent cases show that the Court is enforcing moral imperatives
of a social majority.2 19 Others discuss the increasing tendency
of the Court to cite "tradition" as a means of aligning norms of
constitutional interpretation with mainstream values.2 2 ° Studies show that the Court's First Amendment decisions are better
explained by their protection of mainstream values related to
their content and context than by simply a desire to advance
the inherent values of freedom of expression and religion.
Where economic issues are concerned, the Court favors the
status quo, opting for stability and protection of expectations.2"2'
Stephen Gottlieb makes a compelling case that each of five

Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
216. Swinford & Waltenburg, supra note 214, at 355. These statistics compare to an overall reversal rate of 56% to 62% in all Supreme Court cases in
the mid-1990s. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 347-48 (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt,
517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)).
219. Some scholars explain the Supreme Court's work as advancing the
contemporary policy agenda of the political branches. See, e.g., GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOcIAL CHANGE?
9-36 (1991); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279-81 (1957).
220. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009-10 (1989).
221. See Gottlieb, supra note 163, at 42 n.157.
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"conservative" Justices makes moral judgments based on his or
her own values. For them, morality is "independent, absolute,
and controlling."22 2 In the federalism cases they count on local
communities to instill values and develop character.2 23 Yet
their commitment to intermediate institutions varies from case
to case "considerably with the congeniality of the policies those
institutions adopt."224 In the race cases, they seek "morality
through homogeneity."225 Although the Justices have diverse
perspectives on religion, the majority disfavor minority faiths
and are satisfied with the appearance of state neutrality to religions even if it means that mainstream religions will thrive
and others ultimately will be unable to survive.226
A recent statistical study of the Court's speech cases supports the mainstream-promoting nature of its approach. At
first blush, though, it appears that the record of the Rehnquist
Court actually is quite favorable to those claiming violations of
rights to First Amendment free expression. 227 However, when
the author of the study looked behind the statistics to examine
the types of free expression cases being accepted and the results in them, she found it necessary to qualify substantially
the ostensibly strong record of the Rehnquist Court in protecting free expression as compared to the Burger Court. 22 First,
the percentage of commercial speech cases more than doubled
in the Rehnquist Court. 229 Second, in non-commercial speech
cases there was a difference in the kinds of parties whose
speech the Rehnquist Court allowed to be regulated.2 10 The
study explains that, although the Court has protected so-called
"hate speech" directed against minorities by the KKK and Aryan Brotherhood, it has allowed government to inhibit the

222. GOTTLIEB, supra note 124, at 50.
223. Id. at 110.
224. Id. at 89.
225. Id. at 76-77.
226. Id. at 99-104.
227. See, e.g., Tim O'Brien, The Rehnquist Court: Holding Steady on Freedom of Speech, 22 NOVA L. REV. 713, 713-15 (1998) (claiming that "[tihe
Rehnquist Court has shown impressive allegiance to First Amendment principles").
228. Rosche, supra note 162, at 2705; see also Gottlieb, supra note 163, at
32-37.
229. Rosche, supra note 162, at 2707.
230. Id. at 2715-16; see, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
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rights of free expression by homosexuals and Hare Krishnas." 1
When the apparently pro-free-speech cases are evaluated in the
context of whose speech is being protected by the Courtprimarily commercial interests and those intimidating minorities-and whose speech the Court most often allows to be curtailed-non-mainstream groups-it becomes clear that the
Court is not simply protecting First Amendment rights apart
from the content of the speech but is furthering mainstream
valuesY 2
The synthesizing thread in the racial discrimination, free
expression, and criminal justice decisionmaking trends identified in several hundred cases studied is that the Rehnquist
Court tends to disfavor interests of minorities when they conflict with interests of the majority in society." The Rehnquist
Court's approach, then, may be seen as intervening to correct
choices that do not embrace "traditional," majoritarian, democratic principles.
Gottlieb examined the values that underlie the Rehnquist
Court's decisions and posited that the Court can be understood
in terms of its members' acceptance or rejection of two transcendent values to be furthered by our institutions-protecting
moral autonomy and avoiding harm."4 He contends that an influential core among the Court's members has abjured these
This
traditional beliefs in favor of a particular moral code.'
in
decisions
conclusion is based on his study of the Court's
two
the
which a majority of the Court has typically rejected
values. He sees the tension over these philosophical traditions
as defining a fundamental split on the Court. He argues that
by embracing moral absolutism, a majority of the Court has relaxed the separation between church and state, favored majority faiths in religious freedom cases, and disfavored "immoral"

231. Rosche, supra note 162, at 2715.
232. The same study compared the records of the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts in the criminal justice area and found that the results were statistically about the same. Id. at 2716. Much of the work of the Burger Court in
the area of criminal law memorialized a "retreat from the decisions of the
Warren Court" that were seen by many as overly sympathetic to defendants.
Id. at 2718. The study observes that in terms of its criminal law jurisprudence
the Rehnquist Court has continued "to subjugate criminal rights to the majority's interest in effective law enforcement." Id. at 2726.
233. See id. at 2687.
234. Gottlieb, supra note 163, at 28-29.
235. Id.
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practices. 6 In race cases, the moral absolutist looks for issues
of character of the actor rather than for the effects of the action.
The key to identifying unlawful racial discrimination, then, is
finding intent: A discriminatory purpose focuses on a personal
morality issue, not on the social justice of the consequences." 7
This moral absolutism is an extreme manifestation of a mainstream attitude.
In the realm of economic regulation the Court tends to
support wealth maximization, a preference for the free market
as a good in itself."s Gottlieb argues that this allows the Court
to be unconcerned about community effects or societal good,
while protecting settled expectations and established economic
interestsY 9 While he concedes that the individual Justices
may be guided by moral views that are not totally uniform, he
concludes that they coalesce around the rejection of diversity.2 4 °
Another indication of the Court's attitude preferring mainstream values is the tendency of the Justices to cite "tradition"
as the basis for a particular interpretation and even as the
touchstone for constitutionality. 241' The Court's mainstream
morality has led it explicitly to invoke "traditional" values as
the basis of its decisions to uphold bans on nude dancing 2 and
on homosexual conduct.24 3 Concerns for preserving tradition
permeate the Court's speech and religion decisions as well, resulting in outcomes that disfavor non-mainstream speech and
religions. For instance, the decision in Smith allowing Oregon
236. Id. at 29-31; see also GOTTLIEB, supra note 124.
237. Gottlieb, supra note 163, at 32-34.
238. Id. at 40.
239. Id. at 39-41.
240. Id. at 35-37.
241. See Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and
the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 901 (1993) (discussing the
Court's reliance on history and tradition in constitutional interpretation); Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 177-81 (1993) (arguing for selective use of tradition in constitutional interpretation that neither
"dismiss[es] all that has gone before as irrelevant" nor finds "that the past is
dispositive of constitutional issues").
242. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) ('The traditional police power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for the
public health, safety, and morals. .. ").
243. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); cf. Gottlieb, supra note
90, at 15-17 (suggesting that the majority in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), rejected the Colorado amendment prohibiting local governments from
protecting homosexuals from discrimination because it was overbroad, and the
Court's position remains consistent with sustaining sanctions on homosexual
activity).
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to deny unemployment benefits to a person discharged for ingesting peyote in the rituals of the Native American Church,
while applicable to all religions, "is likely to impinge more
heavily.., on unorthodox religious groups and their practices
than on members of mainstream sects."2 "
Gottlieb views the Rehnquist Court as mediating legislation based on its perceptions of "tradition" and rationality.2 45
Under a classic view of the courts' role, judges will defer to the
political process up to the point that access or participation is
denied or where distinctions are made as the result of past denials of the right to participate.2 46 Consequently, the Court
seems to have retreated from its function of correcting for the
inevitable unresponsiveness of democratic institutions and the
need to ensure access to the system (i.e., to include unpopular
in the process or ensure protection of minority
interests
247
rights).
Other commentators have noted the tendency of the Court
to extend constitutional protections to economic rights as well
as to personal freedoms, departing from the Court's practice of
leaving economic matters largely to the political process. 248
Mark Tushnet has observed that "[the best description of the
modem Court is that it acts in ways that satisfy a rather wellto-do constituency." 249 The best example of this phenomenon
has been the expansion of constitutional protection for rights of
property owners against legislative changes that are inconsistent with their reasonable expectations and therefore could
These
amount to a "taking" of property without due process.'
status quo-oriented decisions tend to favor economically powerful interests (haves) against less advantaged interests (have244.

TINSLEY

E.

YARBROUGH,

THE

REHNQU[ST

COURT

AND

THE

CONSTITUTION 176 (2000).
245. Gottlieb, supra note 163, at 26-28.
246. This is the formulation of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
247. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOvERNMENT 1, 31-75 (1976) (discussing the proper role ofjudicial
review as "an instrument of social policy"); JOHN HART ELY, ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 14-18 (1996) (discussing the role of judicial review
in protecting fundamental and minority interests in the American democratic
political system).
248.

YARBROUGH, supra note 244, at 101-26.

249.

Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the

Chasteningof ConstitutionalAspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 66 (1999).

250. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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nots) such as those seeking regulatory controls of pollution,
land use, labor practices, and so on. In this sense they favor
mainstream, not marginal, interests.
A fundamentally different set of theories, not relying on
the assumption that judges use decisionmaking as an instrument for expressing their philosophies or social policy preferences, claims that the dominant influences are concepts and
values concerning the judicial function or about government in
general-in other words, institutional factors.251 In contrast
with the instrumental approach, this constitutive approach
holds that the Justices rely on institutional norms and legal
principles to fulfill the judiciary's responsibility to maintain institutions in the constitutional structure. 2 Adherents to this
set of theories point to decisions in which the central concern of
the Court seems to have been sorting out the proper roles of different branches of government and not merely using a case to
express a political preference.' They seek to identify the types
of cases in which the Court defers to the political system for
resolution and those in which judicial mediation seems appropriate. Kahn, for instance, examines First Amendment cases to
illustrate that, while policy ends have been different among the
Justices, they have gravitated to important institutional values
to resolve the cases. 4 Nevertheless, the outcomes of the
251. See generally sources cited supra note 193.
252. See Ronald Kahn, InstitutionalNorms and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Rehnquist Court on Privacy and Religion, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 175-76 (Cornell W.
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (a collection of studies addressing the
role of institutional factors in judicial decisions).
253. See, e.g., id. at 177-96.
254. Professor Kahn maintains that the most accurate way to understand
differences among Justices, and among Courts in different eras, is by an examination of their treatment of rights principles and polity principles-that is,
how they weigh individual rights and the powers and processes of governments. Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court as a (Counter)MajoritarianInstitution: Misperceptions of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, 1994 DET.
C.L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). On the Rehnquist Court he identifies a bloc of the
Court, including Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, that trusts majoritarian politics to resolve individual rights questions while Justices like O'Connor, Souter,
Kennedy, and Stevens do not trust the system to protect minority rights. Id.
at 38-39. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg had not joined the Court when Kahn
wrote this article.
The best example of a decision where institutional factors dominated
the Court's expressed rationale was Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 865-68 (1992), where the Court agreed to adhere to precedent prohibiting
certain state laws that restrict abortion rights while expressing concern for
preserving the legitimacy of the Court and the rule of law.
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Court's decisions, whether it was following an instrumental or
a constitutive approach, have largely favored mainstream interests. Thus, with few exceptions, 255 even among the cases selected by Kahn, the Court allows majoritarian institutions to
decide issues when they protect mainstream values,256 but steps
in to protect individual rights when the political branches go
too far
in protecting peculiar, non-mainstream religious
257
views.

VIII. INDIAN LAW AS CRUCIBLE
Identifying the dominant attitudes of the Rehnquist Court
sheds light on its approach to decision making, and the three
trends successfully explain the outcomes of most of its cases. 25
255. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (striking down school
prayer at a public school graduation); cf Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (striking down a law directed at the
religious sacrifice of chickens, finding it to be aimed specifically at the practices of Santeria Church).
256. E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (upholding a New
York City program in which public schools shared teachers with parochial
schools); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990) (finding no Free Exercise violation where a state drug law restricted an
unusual religious practice). The Court has also been inclined to relax limitations on the separation of church and state. E.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 593 (1988) (validating on its face a federal law funding programs that
taught teenagers chastity and adoption as alternatives to abortion). See generally ROBERT J. MCKEEVER, RAW JUDICIAL POWER?: THE SUPREME COURT
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 263 (1993) ("[N]either the fact that the 'wall of separation' between church and state has been dismantled slowly, nor that much of
the conflict over it has been symbolic, should be allowed to detract from the
significance of the conservative victory [by religious groups who influenced
Supreme Court appointments].").
257. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (overturning a
law that required a compelling state interest to justify government interference with free exercise of religion, on the ground that it exceeded congressional authority).
258. Critical race theory may offer a further explanation for the Court's recent decisions. Federal Indian law has its roots in a colonial tradition that
was justified by regarding native peoples as culturally inferior. See generally
ROBERT A. WILLIAMiS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990). It is true that basic concepts of Indian law began as an apology for colonialism. Arguably, the current
Court is simply advancing that tradition. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Court'sPerpetuationof European Cultural
Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 358, 363-67
(1992). Indeed, the three trends in the Court that I identify here as having
swept Indian law in their wake-promotion of states' rights, color-blind justice, and mainstream values-are exactly the kinds of forces that critical race
scholars would expect to result within racial hierarchy.
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The judicial attitudes evident from the Court's decisions have
considerable predictive value for similar cases in the future." 9
The question, however, is whether one gains much predictive
value for Indian cases from the three attitudinally driven
trends or whether Indian law cases are exceptional.
The value of the three trends in predicting the course of
Indian law depends on how the Justices perceive the interests
that might be at stake in each case. Given the nature of most
Indian cases, nearly all of them could be viewed as exciting the
attitudes represented by one or more of the trends. This section illustrates that at least when considered superficially, Indian cases could be seen by the Court as essentially conflicts in
which a state's sovereignty is at stake or a state is an adverse
party, or as cases involving a racial minority asserting "special
rights," or as matters where the rights claimed could have an
anomalous effect on or disrupt mainstream society. As some of
the examples show, often more than one of these perceptions
Yet I remain skeptical that this explanation is sufficient. First, despite its origins, federal Indian law, with its historical insistence on specific
abrogation of tribal rights and powers, has tended to provide a brake on potentially destructive change when Congress did not act with clear intent to abrogate tribal rights. See, e.g., Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (holding that U.S. courts could not prosecute one Indian for murdering another
without a specific statute abrogating tribal jurisdiction). Tribes were treated
even-handedly, if not generously, by the Court in eras when political forces
ran heavily against them. See, for example, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), a controversial decision denying state jurisdiction over
Cherokee territory within Georgia in an era when federalism was being defined by the Court, as discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 6-19.
Second, I do not believe that a case can be made that the present Justices harbor racist motives more extreme than were manifested by any predecessor
Courts.
In any event, the literature of critical race theory provides some perspectives that may be helpful in understanding the limits of traditional institutions for dealing with issues of race and the difficulties people of color generally have in separating themselves from the American mainstream. See
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, CriticalRace Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461, 461 (1993). Moreover, the views of scholars dubious about the efficacy of liberal institutions in dealing with race questions will
be reinforced by recent developments in Indian law. If Indian tribes, with
purportedly solid legal claims to sovereignty, cultural independence, and their
own land base find their rights in jeopardy because of a shift in judicial attitude or behavior, the rights of other minorities, with ostensibly less entrenched rights, appear even more tenuous.
259. Cf. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A

Case of Unfortunate InterdisciplinaryIgnorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 310
(1997) (noting that one scholar claims that the attitudinal model has 90% predictive power).
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can be evoked by a single case.
Although the question of whether a tribe or a state has jurisdiction over a reservation dispute might be perceived as a
minority group's claim for undemocratic, special protection under the law, an Indian law expert would view it differently. A
jurisdiction case defines tribal sovereignty and tests federal
preemption; it is not simply a states' rights matter. These
cases concern primarily political rights, not racial justice or
civil rights.26 The larger issue at stake in nearly all Indian law
cases is the relationship of tribes to the United States-a matter rooted in centuries-old policy created as part of the nation's
constitutional framework.
The Justices, however, do not appear to comprehend Indian law cases as implicating a set of ancient policies that define the nation's relationship with tribes. Although these policies were vividly important to the Framers,2 61 they may have
become obscure and insignificant to the present Court. Today,
Indian cases appear to interest the Court primarily for their intersections with issues that provoke judicial concerns with federalism, minority rights, and mainstream values, not because
they raise distinct questions of Indian law that need to be resolved in order to clarify and perpetuate a historically unique
political arrangement.
Indeed, Indian law has become a crucible for forging a larger agenda important to majorities of the Court. This explains
why a number of Indian cases are on the Court's docket, as well
as the obvious lack of attention to established Indian law principles in the opinions in virtually all of them. Certainly at least
some of the Supreme Court's Indian cases are no more than
auspicious factual settings for the Court's majorities to use in
announcing views on momentous issues completely apart from
their impact on Indians or Indian law. This section examines
several Indian law decisions to illustrate the ways in which the
three Supreme Court trends are being developed in an Indian
law crucible.
2 21
The Rehnquist Court's 2001 decision in Nevada v. Hicks
260. One commentator attributes the Court's recent Indian sovereignty decisions to an "implicit comparison between tribal sovereignty and other racebased legislation." Tweedy, supra note 202, at 181.
261. See supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
262. 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001). Although all nine Justices joined in the judgment, seven members of the Court were party to one or more of four concurring opinions that expressed different rationales and different levels of agree-
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is a stunning example of how it pursues the Justices' larger
agendas in Indian cases while ignoring and misapplying Indian
law principles. The Court catapulted fragments of dicta from a
few cases into sweeping rules that limit tribes' sovereignty over
their reservations.
The mission for a majority of the Court
was apparently to vindicate the authority of the state. To do so
it had to relieve non-Indian state officials of the risks and burdens of being subjected to tribal court jurisdiction when they
violated personal and property rights of Indians on a reservation. While the decision strengthened state prerogatives, it
also curtailed the capacity of separate tribal court systems to
apply standards of justice that might not comport with mainstream values.
In Hicks, state game wardens suspected a member of the
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes in Nevada of illegal hunting.
They obtained a warrant from a state judge to search the tribal
member's home located on tribal land and had it validated by
the tribal court. The search resulted in the seizure of two
mounted sheep heads that turned out not to be evidence of any
crime. After the search, the tribal member brought a trespass
and civil rights suit in tribal court against the wardens individually, alleging that they had exceeded the scope of the
search warrant and had damaged the sheep heads. 64 The Supreme Court held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case. 6 5
The cases leading up to Hicks had made narrow departures
from the usual presumption favoring tribal civil jurisdiction on
reservations for special cases on lands not controlled by tribes.
The departures were based on congressional policies that the
Court found to have the effect of limiting tribal authority over
non-Indians.26 6 The Hicks opinion conflates these special rules
ment or disagreement with the majority. Thus, while the potential reach of
the decision is great, the practical consequences will depend on the outcomes
of future cases.
263. The Court primarily cited dicta in Strate v. A-1 Contractors,Inc., 520
U.S. 438 (1997), Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), and Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See 121 S. Ct. at 2309-11. It
also placed reliance on dicta from two rarely-cited nineteenth century cases:
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), and Utah & Northern Railway
Co. v. Fisher,116 U.S. 28 (1885). See 121 S. Ct. at 2312.
264. 121 S. Ct. at 2308.
265. Id. at 2318.
266. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825, 1835 (2001) (concluding that nonmembers are not subject to hotel tax at a hotel on non-Indian
land); Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (finding no tribal jurisdiction to adjudicate a
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into general principles.
The majority opinion in Nevada v. Hicks epitomizes the use
of states' rights as the lodestar for deciding an Indian case
while disregarding or dismissing traditional Indian law principles."' An overview of the applicable principles shows that
Justice O'Connor was not overstating matters when she said
that the main portion of the majority's decision "is unmoored
from our precedents."26
Writing for the court, Justice Scalia stressed that "the
State's interest in execution of process is considerable enough
to outweigh the tribal interest in self-government even when it
relates to Indian-fee lands."269 As Justice O'Connor observed,
"The majority's sweeping opinion, without cause, undermines
the authority of tribes to make their own laws and be ruled by
them."270 From the perspective of one knowledgeable in Indian
law, "The majority's analysis . . . is exactly backwards."271 As
surprising as Hicks may be, it essentially accelerates a trend in
the Court's approach to Indian law that began about the time
William Rehnquist became Chief Justice.
Established Indian country jurisdiction rules are relatively
clear. Generally, Indians on a reservation are immune from
the application of state law and subject to tribal law. At the
core of the applicable rules is an inquiry into the impact on
tribal sovereignty of the proposed assertion or denial of jurisdiction." 2 When a state seeks to extend its jurisdiction over
personal injury case against a non-Indian on a tribally granted state highway
right-of-way); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565 (holding that no
tribal regulation of non-Indian hunting and fishing is allowed on land owned
in fee by a non-Indian). These decisions concerning non-Indian activities on
non-Indian land within reservations were subject to exceptions so that tribes
would retain jurisdiction over a nonmember's activities, even on fee land, if
the nonmember was present under a consensual relationship or the activity
threatened or had a direct effect on the tribe's political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare. See id. at 565-66.
267. Atkinson TradingCo., 121 S.Ct. at 2308-18.
268. Id. at 2324 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
269. Id. at 2316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Id. at 2324 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
271. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
272. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168-73 (1973).
Where "a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in
activity on the reservation" the Court will examine all the federal laws, treaties, and policies "in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and
the notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of
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non-Indians in Indian country the Court has said that "absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."27
Different rules apply to non-Indian (or nonmember) conduct when the tribe is asserting jurisdiction. In Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe 4 the Supreme Court announced that
when tribes were incorporated into the United States they lost
the power to try and punish non-Indians for crimes committed
in their territory. 5 The Court presumed that the tribes' inherent sovereignty must be limited because the ability to deprive
non-Indians of personal liberties would be "inconsistent with
their status."76
Oliphant's rule did not extend to tribal civil jurisdiction
and the Court later recited that "[ciivil jurisdiction over [nonmember] activit[y] presumptively lies in the tribal courts
unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or
federal statute."277 Then in Montana v. United States27 the
Court announced a new presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction when nonmember conduct occurs on non-Indian land.
The Crow Tribe was trying to regulate hunting and fishing by a
non-Indian on non-Indian-owned fee land within its reservation." The Court denied the tribe's jurisdiction but still declined to extend Oliphant'sblanket rule denying tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians to civil jurisdiction matters."o
While the Court decided that tribes presumptively do not have
jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian land, it said that
"[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on

tribal independence." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
144-45 (1980). In this preemption analysis, the Court will take account of
state interests "to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of
state authority would violate federal law." Id. at 145.
273. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). This test has been applied
principally when a state asserts its jurisdiction in Indian country in "situations involving non-Indians." McClanahan,411 U.S. at 179.
274. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
275. Id. at 211.
276. Id. at 208 (quoting the lower court in Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d
1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).
277. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).

278. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
279. Id. at 547-49.

280. Id. at 565.
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their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands."281' Thus, the
presumption against tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee
land could be rebutted if the non-Indian had entered into consensual relations with the tribe or its members or if the nonmember's conduct would threaten or affect the political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe.2 82
The Court in Hicks treated Oliphant as if its flat denial of
tribal jurisdiction had been applied in Montana v. United
States, calling it "the 'general proposition' derived from Ol2 8' Oliphant, however,
iphant."
was based on the Court's view
that the restriction on personal liberty in a criminal case was
"central to the sovereign interests of the United States," like
the tribes' power to dispose of their lands without the national
government's consent and their power to engage in foreign relations, both of which were lost upon the discovery of the continent by Europeans. 4
When the Court addressed civil jurisdiction over nonIndians in Montana v. United States, it did not follow the Oliphant rationale. It looked at treaty and statutory language
and found that it was the congressional policy of allotment,
opening the reservation up to settlement and occupation by
nonmembers, that had qualified the tribe's jurisdiction. 5 Thus,
the "land alienation occasioned by that policy [had an effect] on
Indian treaty rights tied to use and occupation of reservation
land."8 6 Accordingly, in a case decided the next term, the Court
281. Id.
282. Id. at 565-66.
283. 121 S. Ct. at 2310 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 56465); see discussion supra note 33. The rules in Oliphant and Montana v.
United States and their underlying rationales have been subject to criticism.
See, e.g., Getches, supra note 2 at 1595-99, 1608-13.
284. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210; see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 543-44 (1832) (holding that, upon "discovery" by European nations, tribes
lost power to transfer lands without the consent of the discovering nation and
to engage in external relations with other nations); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 570 (1823); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The Court said that there had always been an "unspoken assumption" that
tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians based on evidence that
"Congress shared the view" of all branches of government. Oliphant,435 U.S.
at 203.
285. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 558-60. The Court said, "It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians
purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an
avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal
government." Id. at 560 n.9.
286. Id. at 560 n.9.
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allowed a tribe to exercise the jurisdiction over non-Indian
hunting and fishing that it had denied in Montana v. United
States, noting that the essential distinction between the cases
was that the activity took place on tribal land, not on nonIndian fee land as in Montana v. United States.28
By the time the Court decided Hicks, however, it would acknowledge only that "tribal ownership is a factor in the Montana analysis."' 8 Moreover, the Montana v. United States
analysis went from a rebuttable presumption against tribal jurisdiction to a nearly absolute rule when the Court refused to
apply the broadly worded exceptions that would allow tribal jurisdiction in many cases.
The exception for consensual relations was dismissed in a
footnote as not intended to apply to arrangements like the cooperative effort of the tribe and the state in jointly approving a
search warrant.8 9 The tribal interests exception was not even
analyzed to determine whether a state official abusing his authority by invading the rights of a tribal member on tribal land
could "threaten[] or ha[ve] some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
8 ' Justice
tribe.""
Scalia said that addressing these concerns was
unnecessary because tribes are "guaranteed" that "the actions
of these state officers cannot threaten or affect th[eir] interests.., by the limitations of federal constitutional and statutory law to which the officers are fully subject."29 ' This seems to
say that when state officials violate state or federal laws while
on tribal property, their conduct could not possibly affect selfgovernment or other tribal interests, because theoretically,
there are legal remedies in other fora.
Justice Scalia applied the purported "'general proposition,'" derived from dicta in Oliphant,saying that "the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe'" except to the extent "necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations."'292 He concluded that tribal regulatory jurisdiction over
the game wardens in the particular case was unnecessary.
This approach resembles a long-discredited version of the in287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1983).
Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2001) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2310 n.3.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566.
Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2316.
Id. at 2320 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 564-65).
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fringement test.293 Not only has the Supreme Court never ap-

plied the test of whether state action infringes on the right of
reservation Indians to be governed by their own rules to tribal
jurisdiction cases but, when it has used the test, the Court has
clearly rejected arguments that state jurisdiction should presumptively apply whenever no infringement can be proved.294
Justice Scalia's opinion includes several other dicta that are
troubling from the standpoint of maintaining the integrity of
Indian law but which seem to be motivated by an agenda that
goes beyond Indian law.295
In Hicks, the Court changed Indian law in its vindication of
states' rights. In other cases, the Court has used Indian cases
to make rules of law that are much broader than Indian law.
For instance, the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida2 is perceived by scholars, and I believe was intended by
the Court, primarily to announce a new rule on the sovereign
immunity of states and to limit Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. 297 These reforms in constitutional law are
293. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); see also supra note 273
and accompanying text.
294. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 179-81
(1973). At best, state jurisdiction precedents were relevant to show that it is
an infringement on tribal self-government when individual tribal members are
subjected to authority other than tribal authority. If allowing a non-Indian to
hail a reservation Indian into state court would be an infringement in Williams, and allowing a state to impose an income tax on an individual reservation Indian in McClanahan would infiinge tribal sovereignty, it follows that
the violation of personal or property rights of a reservation Indian perpetrated
by a state officer trying to enforce state law on tribal land on the reservation
impacts tribal government.
295. See, e.g., Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2312 (conceding that while "it is not entirely clear from our precedent" whether state law enforcement is allowed on
Indian reservations, "several of our opinions point in that direction"). The
Court relies on dicta in two nineteenth century decisions that Scalia interprets
to express "concern ... over ... federal encroachment on state prerogatives."
Id. (citing Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) and United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)). But cf., e.g., Cohen, supra note 1 at 259 ("State
law generally is not applicable to Indian affairs within the territory of an Indian tribe.. . ."); id. at 349-52 (discussing the general rule and narrow exceptions). Interestingly, Kagama rejected the arguments that the state had jurisdiction over a murder committed by an Indian and indicated that, even if
Congress had not made it a federal crime under the Major Crimes Act, the
state courts would not have jurisdiction. See 118 U.S. at 384-85.
296. 517 U.S. 44 (1996), rev'g Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989).
297. See, e.g., Laura M. Herpers, State Sovereign Immunity: Myth or Reality after Seminole Tribe v. Florida?, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1005, 1038 (1997);
Eleas Home, Seminole Tribe v. Florida: The Eleventh Amendment Upholds
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motivated by a Court majority's attitude toward states' rights.
Choosing an Indian case to announce them actually might have
made the changes more palatable to swing voters on the Court,
not to mention to a public insensitive to the Indian law implications.
The law being applied in Seminole Tribe may have looked
like an example of congressional disregard for states' rights. It
seemed that Congress had designed a bizarre social welfare
scheme for Indians-casino gambling-and threw in a right to
sue an objecting state. When the legislation was challenged,
the United States invoked the Commerce Clause power. Arguably, this factual setting made it an "easier" case on the facts
than if it had directly involved a state's resistance to the application of popular legislation in other fields. Why, one might
ask, should a state be subjected to a lawsuit over whether a
tribe can legalize gambling?
As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the decision had
"importance" even if it was merely an Indian case:
The majority's opinion does not simply preclude Congress from establishing the rather curious statutory scheme under which Indian tribes
may seek the aid of a federal court to secure a State's good-faith negotiations over gaming regulations. Rather, it prevents Congress from
providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States,
from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning
bankruptcy,
environmental law, and the regulation of our national
2
economy.

8

Although ostensibly the case was simply Florida's challenge to a law that let an Indian tribe sue a state to challenge
its anti-gambling laws, Seminole Tribe looks different through
an Indian law lens. There is a deeper history that rehearses
the traditional application of Indian law principles. The issue
was, at bottom, about Indian law and the special realm of federal power conceded by the states when the Constitution was
formed. Consider how and why Seminole Tribe came to the
Supreme Court.
In 1987, the Supreme Court denied California's authority
State Sovereign Immunity in the Face of CongressionalAbrogation to the Contrary, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 108, 138 (1997); Timothy C. San-

sone, Constricting the Commerce Clause: Seminole Tribe as an Extension of
Lopez and New York, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1327, 1359 (1997). Others have
suggested that the Court may have seen Seminole Tribe as an "opportunity to
erode tribal sovereignty." E.g., Melissa L. Koehn, The New American Caste
System: The Supreme Court and DiscriminationAmong Civil Rights Plaintiffs,
32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 49, 66 (1998).
298. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to restrict gambling allowed by tribal law on the Cabazon Reservation.299 It applied foundation principles to preserve tribal
self-government and to limit the authority of the state on reservations.' Then Congress, exercising its plenary power over
Indian affairs, stepped in to moderate the ability of Cabazon
and other tribes to entertain gambling that might be out of step
with state policies. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
replaced the Court's Cabazon decision."'
It allowed tribal
autonomy from state regulation through a detailed scheme by
which Congress classified different types of games according to
the levels of interest states had expressed in regulating them
and allocated authority between tribes and states under federal
oversight.'
Tribes were left free to regulate social games."0
Bingo and card games not played against the house were allowed if they could be played legally anywhere in the state."
Casino-type games and card games against the house were subject to the terms of a "compact" to be negotiated between the
particular tribe and the state.' If a state failed to negotiate a
compact with the tribe in good faith, the matter was to go into a
mediation process, but the determination of whether the state
acted in good faith was to be made by a federal court."'6
The issue in Seminole Tribe was whether Congress in the
IGRA could authorize a tribe to bring this issue to court with a
state as defendant."' The Court ultimately treated Seminole
Tribe as if the legislation being applied were indistinguishable
from legislation enacted under the interstate Commerce Clause.
299. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 22122 (1987).
300. See id. at 214-21.
301. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
302. See id. § 2703(6)-(8).
303. Id. § 2710(a)(1).
304. Id. § 2710(a)(2).
305. See id. § 2710(a)(6).
306. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), 2710(d)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
307. Curiously, the federal court checkpoint may have favored states in
practice. It allowed judicial review of the state's approach to negotiation before the matter would be taken out of the state's hands. Seminole Tribe struck
down the step in the process that allowed the state to prove its good faith before the matter went to a mediator who could present a "last offer" to the state.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74-75 (1996). Now, however, if the
state rejects this offer, the Secretary of the Interior can unilaterally impose
compact terms in consultation only with the tribe-just as if the state had
gone to court and lost. Id. Justice Stevens's dissent notes that this is how the
court of appeals assumed the IGRA process would work in absence of the judicial review provision. Id. at 99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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It never grappled with the question of whether legislation enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause might authorize congressional limitation of state sovereignty where the interstate
Commerce Clause does not. 0 Thus, it failed to acknowledge
that the Indian Commerce Clause was the bedrock of a complex
political relationship with tribes created by the Framers and
honored in two centuries of legal tradition.
The case came to the Supreme Court with the inertia of
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a recent precedent supporting
Congress's power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of states
and allow them to be sued under the interstate Commerce
Clause.0 9 To prevail under the authority of that case the tribe
had to argue that the Indian Commerce Clause gave Congress
no less power than did the interstate Commerce Clause. This
was easy, and the Supreme Court accepted the principle that
"[ilf anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a
greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause."31 0 In its
zeal to overrule Union Gas, however, the Court failed to address whether Congress's power to authorize suit against states
under the Indian Commerce Clause might be sufficiently distinct, and greater than its power under the interstate Commerce Clause, to uphold the legislation.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court was applying a law in which
Congress had exercised its venerable plenary power over the
historic federal-tribal relationship by curbing tribal powers for
the benefit of the states, subject to a judicial checkpoint. The
Court discussed the history and philosophy of state sovereign
immunity but did not mention the Framers' intent with respect
to Indian tribal relations. Justice Souter's scholarly, eighty-five
page dissent drew on original intent and pointed out that the
states never had any sovereignty over Indian affairs and therefore there could be no sovereign immunity for Congress to abrogate.3 1' The Indian law portion of his argument, however, oc308. The Court itself had cautioned only six years before that federal enactments, generally under the Indian Commerce Clause power, were subject to
a different analysis for purposes of preemption analysis: '"The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal
enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards ... that have emerged in
other areas of the law." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.

136, 143 (1980).
309. 491 U.S. 1, 12 (1989).
310. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 62.
311. Id. at 147-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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cupied less than two pages. He did not suggest, and the Court
apparently did not consider, the possibility that the IGRA could
be sustained even if legislation under the interstate Commerce
Clause might be vulnerable. As the majority and dissenting
opinions reveal, for the Justices, Seminole Tribe was a states'
rights case about the future validity of Union Gas and the interstate Commerce Clause; it was not about Indian law. Thus,
without fanfare, the Court for the first time in history found
that legislation regarding Indian affairs exceeded Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause.
In passing the IGRA, Congress fulfilled its role as the arbiter of the political relationship between tribes and the United
States, a role that has often been invoked to define limits on
state authority. Taken in context, the IGRA expanded the
states' role in deciding the scope and extent of reservation
gambling and reduced and regulated tribal authority. Whatever doubts one may have about the wisdom of the balance
struck by Congress or the complexity of the Act, it was essentially the redefinition of a political relationship: whether Congress, in the exercise of its powers under the Indian Commerce
Clause, could go farther than it could go under the interstate
Commerce Clause. The answer is still not clear. 12 Although
the Court was aware of the distinct histories and traditions of
the interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses, it made no attempt to decide the case narrowly based on the latter clause.
For the majority, the case was a crucible for developing a federalism agenda rather than "simply" the interpretation of an Indian affairs statute.313
312. It does not appear that tribes will suffer much direct harm under the
IGRA as a result of Seminole Tribe. Indeed, the greatest impact may be on
legislation in other fields. Depending on the willingness of the Secretary of
the Interior to take a strong position, tribes may actually find the IGRA process more to their advantage without the provision for federal judicial review.
See Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 3-4 (1997).
The impact on other Indian legislation of the Court's conflation of the
interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses is unknown. The Court has, however, continued to narrow its reading of the interstate Commerce Clause's
grant of power to Congress. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848,
858-59 (2000) (construing a federal arson statute as inapplicable to a private
home in order to avoid a possible Commerce Clause issue); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against
Women Act as beyond the commerce power).
313. See Christopher P. Banks, Reversals of Precedentand JudicialPolicyMaking: How JudicialConceptions of Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court
Influence Social Change, 32 AKRON L. REV. 233, 249 (1999) ("Seminole Tribe is
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In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,314 the Court again used an
Indian case to address its interest in states' rights. The decision bolstered state sovereign immunity by preventing a tribe
from suing the state to vindicate its property rights to submerged lands.' 5 The Court curtailed the reach of the so-called
Ex parte Young doctrine, which had been widely used to circumvent state immunity by bringing suit against a state official
instead of naming the state. 16 In some earlier cases concerning
state ownership of submerged lands, the Supreme Court recognized that the political relationship and historical situation
leading to the establishment of an Indian reservation could justify a reversal of the usual presumption that all submerged
lands pass to new states on statehood." By denying a forum to
determine whether Congress intended to extinguish or preserve
the tribe's rights in the submerged lands in Coeur d'Alene, the
Supreme Court rendered largely theoretical the tribe's ability
to claim sovereign and proprietary rights that preceded the
state's existence. 18 Thus, tribes were lumped with private
claimants rather than with sovereigns in applying Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, an area where the Court has gone
beyond the text of the Amendment to perpetuate the immunity
of states from suit by relying on various implications and understandings divined from its reading of history." 9

a significant Eleventh Amendment case that advances a particular partisan
vision about what federalism means in America today.").
314. 521 U.S. 261 (1997). The decision is analyzed critically by John P.
LaVelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex Parte Young Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 787 (1999).
315. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 287-88.
316. Id. at 281-88; see also Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against a state official).
317. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1970)
(establishing that an Indian reservation can be an appropriate public purpose
for denying the state's ownership of submerged lands under the policy set out
in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1894)).
318. The claims were later pressed and vindicated by the United States as
trustee for the tribe's lands. See Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2135
(2001).
319. In fact, Coeur d'Alene Tribe relied in part upon another Indian law decision in which the Court assumed that states would not have consented to the
Constitution if they thought that they would be subject to suits by tribes.
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). Justice Scalia
based the Court's holding in the case on a "presupposition of our constitutional
structure" that tribes were not like the other governments (state or federal)
that could sue states. Id.
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In another Indian case, the Supreme Court scrapped the
well-established "compelling interest" test for judging whether
state laws infringe the right of free exercise of religion under
the First Amendment. The case the Court used as a crucible
for formulating this pronouncement was Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith.Y° It may have seen
in Smith an appealing factual situation for ruling that states
should not be burdened with proving a compelling interest to
enforce its laws every time someone claims to have violated the
law in the name of religion. A drug counselor took drugs and
was fired for cause, then asked the state to pay unemployment
benefits. 321 Apparently moved by the prospect that a state
might be liable to compensate a discharged drug-taking employee unless it can prove a compelling interest, Justice Scalia
said that "such a system would be courting anarchy,... [and]
that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them."3 22 When Alfred Smith, an elderly Indian
man, braved a rainy night to attend a meeting with a few fellow members of the Native American Church, he must not have
realized as he took the sacrament, placing a bitter peyote cactus button in his mouth, that so much was at stake.
Because of its unusual facts, unlikely to be replicated in
mainstream religion cases, Smith may have been the "best
case" for the Court to choose as a vehicle for changing First
Amendment law and giving governments more latitude to regulate religious practices that are contrary to mainstream norms.
Nevertheless, scholars broadly criticized the ruling, as did representatives of organized religion who feared that it could be
extended over practices of more popular religious faiths.3" So
they persuaded Congress to pass legislation restoring strict

320. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
321. See id. at 874.
322. Id. at 888.
323. E.g., John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free
Exercise Clause:A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71, 72 (1991)
(arguing that "minority religious claims will be held hostage to majoritarian
politics" after the Smith decision); Roald Mykkelvedt, Employment Division v.
Smith: Creating Anxiety by Relieving Tension, 58 TENN. L. REV. 603, 631
(1991) (concluding that "[i]f the Smith decision stands, the degree to which
various sects will be free to exercise their religions will be determined by their
political power and not by the application of legal principles by a disinterested
judiciary").
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scrutiny of government actions inhibiting religious practice.324
The Court then asserted its power by striking down the remedial legislation. 2 5 By being at the center of a First Amendment
debate, Smith has gotten far more attention than most Indian
decisions. Although its impact on the fundamentals of Indian
law is not pervasive (because it did not deal with tribal sovereignty or reservation rights), it illustrates the Court's marginalization of Indian values as it selects cases to further a larger
agenda.
Two years before Smith, the Court had declined to protect
Indian sacred sites on federal land from destruction without
applying the compelling interest test. 26 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n was little noticed outside Indian
law, however, because it did not purport to strike down the
well-established general rule327 but instead found the test inapplicable to a conflict between public land laws and Indian religious practices on federal lands,"u a situation that evoked little
empathy, even from erstwhile free exercise advocates. Yet
Lyng is even more emblematic of the depreciation of values 3to
29
be maintained by the "measured separatism" of Indian tribes
because it involved the place-based religion of Indians, making
it even less like mainstream religions than the communion-like
(albeit hallucinogen-ingesting) sacrament involved in Smith.
Ultimately, land and nature provide the nexus for all Indian
social, political, and religious values. Without a basic accep324. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb - 2000bb-4
(1994) (restoring the compelling interest test requiring strict scrutiny of laws
burdening religious freedom).
325. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). By striking down
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act the "Supreme Court underscored its
power." O'BRIEN, supra note 81, at 370.
326. Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-52
(1988).
327. The Court, indeed, did not reach the compelling interest test, because
it said the tribes had not proven that the government's actions were sufficient
to "prohibit the free exercise of [their] religion." 485 U.S. at 450-52. This did
not stop Justice Scalia from finding Lyng was indistinguishable: "[Ilt is hard to
see any reason in principle or practicality why the government should have to
tailor its health and safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief,
but should not have to tailor its management of public lands. . . ." Smith, 494
U.S. at 885 n.2.
328. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447.
329. Charles Wilkinson has used the term "measured separatism" to describe the essential result of traditional Indian law that is preserved by tribal
sovereignty and limited state jurisdiction in Indian country. See WILKINSON,
supra note 1, at 14-19.
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tance, if not understanding, of this reality, the Court is less
likely to consider Indian law very "important."
In Lyng, the Court assumed that allowing the government
to build a highway into the sacred lands of the tribal claimants
within a national forest "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices."33 In fact, the lower court
had found that the land use decision in question would "virtually destroy the... Indians' ability to practice their religion."33'
As the Court candidly acknowledged in Smith, "[L]eaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in; but that [is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic gov-

ernment.

,,33'

Other Rehnquist Court decisions have manifested the discomfort the Justices feel for upholding "special treatment" of
Native Americans under the law.
The case of Rice v.
3 33 could have been selected and
Cayetano
decided as a crucible
for advancing the Court's "color-blind" approach to racial justice. The Court reversed a decision allowing the state of Hawaii to conduct a Natives-only election of trustees to administer
a trust to benefit Native Hawaiians.3
It found that the Fifteenth Amendment, adopted after the Civil War to prevent
states from denying the elective franchise to former slaves,
prevented Hawaii's attempt
a perceived history of
• -r , to 1 address
335
injustice toward its Native peoples.
The Court struck down a state constitutional amendment
that had been adopted by a vote of the citizens (including the
non-Native majority). The Court disregarded the circumstances, motives, and historical backdrop that led to a majoritysanctioned special election of trustees for the benefit of a disadvantaged Native minority. These facts would take the case out
of the purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, which was to prevent the white majority from excluding racial minorities from
the basic civil right of participating in democratic government.
A wooden application of the law, of course, is essential to the
Court's negative approach to affirmative action programs and
330. 485 U.S. at 451.
331. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693

(9th Cir. 1986).
332. 494 U.S. at 890.
333. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
334. See id. at 517.
335. See id. at 499.
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other government measures that take race into account. In
Rice, however, it was not necessary for the Court to confront
that issue because the precedents support the constitutional
authority of Congress to legislate on behalf of Native peoples.3 6
Thus, regardless of the Court's views on the construction of the
Fifteenth Amendment, it might have distinguished the case as
being within the power of Congress in Indian affairs. Instead
of deciding the case on Indian law principles, it seized the moment to press the color-blind approach to which several members adhere.33 7
Several Indian cases decided by the Court, like those reviewed here, surely were crucibles for developing legal principles that, in the minds of the Justices, have nothing to do with
Indian law. However, this still does not explain the preponderance of other Supreme Court Indian decisions that raise issues
peculiar to Indian reservations and that result in decisions concerning only questions of governance of Indian country. Even
cases not selected as crucibles for developing specific legal rules
important to the Court may attract the Court's interest by implicating the Justices' strongly held attitudes. The typical reservation governance case involves some or all of the Court's
concerns with states' rights, apparent special treatment of minorities, or conflicts with mainstream values.3
The Court's
concern with these issues may draw the Justices to Indian law
cases and, when deciding them, provide a forum for expressing
their attitudinal preferences without focusing on Indian law
principles or the consequences for the political position of tribes
in our system.
The results in Indian cases support the Court's strong
preference for the position of states as reflected in the entirety
of its record. 39 This is significant because 68% of all Indian
cases decided by the Rehnquist Court have involved a state as a
party or a question of state jurisdiction. 4 9 The Court does not
336. E.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-55 (1974) (upholding Congress's authority to single out Native Americans for specific legislative treatment); see also Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979); United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 645-47 (1977); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 479-80 (1976); Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424
U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976).
337. See supra notes 197-212 and accompanying text.

338. See supra Part VII.
339. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
340. From the 1986 Term through the 2000 Term, twenty-eight of the
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always rule in favor of states in such cases. Indeed, in the last
ten years, tribes have prevailed over state interests in four
cases. In Rice v. Cayetano, for example, the state had taken a
position supporting Native American interests. The Court rejected the state's position.14 ' The Court's attitude favoring
states and states' rights, however, is well-illustrated in the
Eleventh Amendment cases like Seminole Tribe,342 as well as by
the statistical record.
Similarly, the confluence of the Justices' distaste for racially defined institutions and their preference for mainstream
values with states' rights is seen in the opinions denying tribal
jurisdiction.343 Consider, for instance, Strate v. A-1 Contractors.34 A plaintiff who had lived her adult life on the reservation and whose children were all tribal members sued the defendant in tribal court for injuries she sustained in an accident

Court's forty-one Indian decisions had a state as a party or involved a contest
over whether state jurisdiction applied. Nevada v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304
(2001); Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2135 (2001); Arizona v. California,
120 S. Ct. 2304 (2000); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Ariz. Dep't of
Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999); Cass County v. Leech Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522
U.S. 520 (1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998);
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450
(1995); Dep't of Taxation and Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61
(1994); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508
U.S. 679 (1993); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114
(1993); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30 (1989); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988); California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
341. 528 U.S. at 517. The other cases in which states did not prevail over
Indian interests were Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2135, 2146-47 (2001),
which recognized tribal ownership of a lakebed within the reservation, Arizona v. California,120 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2000), which allowed a tribe to pursue a water rights claim, and Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 207-08 (1999), discussed infra notes 386-91 and
accompanying text.
342. See 517 U.S. 44.
343. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
344. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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on a reservation road.'
The Supreme Court said that the
plaintiff could not sue in her own community on the reservation
but would have to take the case to a "state forum [that is] open
to all who sustain injuries on North Dakota's highway."346 The
Court found that "requiring [the non-Indian defendants] to defend against this commonplace state highway accident claim in
an unfamiliar court is not crucial to" the tribe's interests.347 In
joining a later decision relieving a state official from having to
defend himself in a suit for trespass to an Indian home on
tribal land, Justice Souter wrote in Nevada v. Hicks,
Tribal courts also differ from other American courts (and often from
one another) in their structure, in the substantive law they apply, and
in the independence of their judges. Although some modern tribal
courts "mirror American courts" and "are guided by written codes,
rules, procedures, and guidelines," tribal law is still frequently unwritten, being based instead "on the values, mores, and norms of a
tribe and expressed in its customs, traditions, practices," and is often
"handed down orally or by example from one generation to another."
The resulting law applicable in tribal courts is a complex "mix of
tribal codes and federal, state, and traditional
348 law," which would be
unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.

In the tribal court jurisdiction cases, the issue was not the
specific denial of any fundamental right, but a general concern
with difference-the kind of difference that might be expressed
with the laws of any other country or, indeed, among states
which, in our federal system, may apply their own mix of laws
ranging from the common law of England to unique local ordinances.3 49 In these cases, however, the Court has treated the

345. See id. at 442-43.
346. Id. at 459.
347. Id. (footnote omitted).
348. 121 S. Ct. 2304, 2323 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also supra note 122.
349. See Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J.
762, 771 (1941) (describing the 'Juristic data" available to state courts to "include the state constitution and statutes, former opinions of the state courts of
every rank, opinions of the courts of other states, the Restatements of the
American Law Institute, the works of juristic writers, [and] the mores and
practices of the community"); see also Ellen A. Peters, Capacityand Respect: A
Perspective on the HistoricRole of the State Courts in the Federal System, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1070-71 (1998) (observing that those "who serve on state
supreme courts see the creation of an integrated state jurisprudence, without
sharp lines of demarcation between constitutional law, statutory law, and
judge-made law, as part of [their] judicial responsibility"); Jill Welch, Local
Government-Home Rule Doctrine and State Preemption-TheIowa Supreme
Court ResurrectsDillon's Rule and Blurs the Line Between Implied Preemption
and Inconsistency, 30 RUTGERs L.J. 1548, 1548 (1999) (discussing "the tension
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matter as if the most powerful factors were the unfamiliarity of
the tribal court to the defendant. The Court acknowledged the
impact on the tribe's interests in maintaining reservation
health and safety through the exercise of sovereignty over reservation activities35 but, unlike a traditional conflict of law
analysis, gave no weight to the preference for the local law of
the place of injury." 1 If the Court's role in these cases had been
to make a conflict of law balancing decision, even without applying Indian law principles, it arguably did not do so with a
full appreciation of the tribal interests that were at stake.
The Court in Strate had to indulge incredible legal contortions to deny jurisdiction to the tribal court. To circumvent
usual Indian law rules, Justice Ginsburg first explained away
the Court's own recent statement that civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians "presumptively lies in the tribal courts" 5 2 as
meaning that if a tribe had established its regulatory jurisdiction then it also would have judicial jurisdiction. 3
Besides
converting that statement of law from the 1987 Iowa Mutual
case into a tautology, her explanation was implausible given
the context of that case, which had nothing to do with regulatory jurisdiction.
Next, Ginsburg recast an element of basic property law by
saying that the tribe's conveyance of a road right-of-way passed
the equivalent of fee title to the state.5 4 This was necessary to
revise the facts of Strate so they would look more like Montana
v. United States, where the Court held that, subject to certain
exceptions, tribes lack jurisdiction over the activities of non-

between the Iowa Constitution's limitation on local ordinances, which are inconsistent with state laws, and the express statutory grant of power to localities to set standards and requirements which are higher or more stringent
than those imposed by state law").
350. See Hicks, 121 S.Ct. at 2310 ('[Ilnherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe except to
the extent 'necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations.'") (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981));
Strate, 520 U.S. at 457 (noting that Indian tribes lack civil authority over the
conduct of nonmembers except concerning "conduct that 'threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe") (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at
556).
351. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 732-33 (3d ed. 2000).
352. Strate, 520 U.S. at 451 (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480
U.S. 9, 18 (1987)).
353. Id. at 451-53.
354. Id. at 456.
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Indians on their own fee land. 5 Then she had to overcome an
exception to the Montana rule for non-Indians who were in a
consensual relationship with the tribe."5
The defendant in
Strate was working on a tribal contract to landscape the tribal
headquarters when he was driving his truck along a road in
front of the plaintiffs reservation home and collided with her
car. 5 ' Justice Ginsburg refused, however, to apply the exception to the defendant because the plaintiffwas not also a party
to the tribal contract."'
The other exception to the Montana rule recognized the inherent power of tribes over non-Indians, even on non-Indian
land, whenever the conduct "threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."3 59 Ginsburg had to admit that this exception, on its face, "undoubtedly" applied.6 0 Yet she said that to
apply it in circumstances where tribal self-government was not
more seriously threatened "would severely shrink the [Montana] rule."36'
Consistent with its preference for mainstream values, the
Court also has used Indian cases to advance the view that
statutory interpretation should not result in major shifts in
wealth. In two recent cases, enormous economic benefits from
natural resources development were at stake for tribes. 362 To
uphold the tribal position required, in one case, disgorging millions of dollars from a state treasury, 36 and in the other, denying millions of dollars in royalties to private non-Indian entities." The Court upheld the status quo and expectations of the
state and the private landowners in the two cases, although
these parties had relied on assumptions that proved legally in-

355. 450 U.S. at 564-67.
356. See id. at 565; supra notes 269-82 and accompanying text.
357. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442-43.
358. Id. at 457.
359. Id. at 446 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565-66).
360. Id. at 457-58.
361. Id. at 458; see also Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825,
1829 (2001) (refusing to apply either Montana exception to allow a tribal tax
on guests at a reservation hotel on an isolated parcel of non-Indian land that
received tribal governmental services).
362. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999); Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998).
363. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 713.
364. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 871-72.
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correct in the first case365 and factually incorrect in the other.366
In Montana v. Crow Tribe, both the state and the tribe imposed taxes on coal produced from lands where the tribe owned
the mineral estate. 67 The tribe secured a court of appeals decision that the state tax was illegal and the tribal tax was lawful.3 63 In the meantime, the state had collected millions of dollars in taxes."' The Court reversed a lower court order that the
funds collected by the state pursuant to its unlawful tax should
be disgorged and paid over to the tribe, finding that it would be
"inequitable" to the state to alter the status quo under the circumstances."'
In Amoco v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, the Court revived a
popular misconception about the nature of coal-bed methane
gas to avoid altering an arrangement where royalties were paid
to overlying non-Indian landowners rather than to the tribe
that owned the coal estate.37 The United States had conveyed
rights to minerals to surface owners along with title to the surface, but reserved coal rights, which it later conveyed to the
tribe.'
As between the surface owners and the tribe that
owned the coal estate, the surface owners prevailedY.7 ' The
Court recognized that the methane gas in coal seams was a
dangerous waste produced along with coal and that it had not
been understood to be a valuable, extractable mineral at the
time of the conveyance of mineral rights to the surface owners. 4 Nevertheless, the Court held that when the conveyance
was made, coal was thought of only as a solid substance, and
since methane is a gas and not solid (a "fact" that is not entirely
true until the coal seam is opened and the gas is liberated from
the coal),3 7' rights to the methane were not reserved along with
the coal.3 6 The Court seemed concerned that the landowners
and methane producers had been influenced by and relied on
365. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. at 715-19.
366. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 880.
367. 523 U.S. at 702.
368. See id. at 706 (citing Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895
(9th Cir. 1987)).
369. See id. at 702.
370. See id. at 716.
371. 526 U.S. at 877-80.
372. See id. at 870.
373. See id. at 868.
374. See id. at 876.
375. Federal Respondents' Brief at 5-6, Amoco (No. 98-830).
376. 526 U.S. at 874-75.
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an opinion of a government attorney in 1981 that the methane
had passed apart from the coal as part of the mineral estate. 77
The non-Indian reliance concerns in these cases are similar
to those in two earlier Indian water rights decisions. In Nevada v. United States, the Court refused to reopen a water
rights decree where a tribe had been represented by government attorneys who had a conflict of interest and had claimed
little water for the benefit of the tribe.37 8 The Court held that
the tribe was bound by the earlier decree under res judicata
principles, noting that both parties and non-parties "have relied.., on the Orr Ditch decree in participating in the development of western Nevada ....
," Likewise, in Arizona v. California,80 federal attorneys representing the tribes had not
claimed all of the irrigable acreage to which the tribes were entitled,' resulting in the Court awarding them rights to less water. The tribes tried to reopen the case to claim a greater share
of the water but were turned back by the Court." The opinion
did not question the fact that the tribes had suffered from inadequate legal representation at the hands of the government,
but cautioned that "[ciertainty of rights is particularly important with respect to water rights in the Western United
States."383 So the Court held that the tribes must be content
with a lower quantity of water based on the "compelling need
for certainty in the holding and use of water rights."3 84
377. Id. at 871-73.
378. 463 U.S. 110, 143 (1983). The Court later cited Nevada's concern for
non-Indian water claimants to justify a decision allowing non-Indians, who
were adverse to a tribe in water rights litigation, to obtain a tribe's confidential communications with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) by directing a request to the BIA under the Freedom of Information Act. See Dep't of Interior
and Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 121 S.
Ct. 1060, 1069 (2001). The BIA had sought the information in its capacity as
the tribe's trustee in preparing for the litigation, and the documents may not
have been discoverable in the litigation. See id. at 1064. The Court rejected
the argument that the communication was internal in that the tribe was effectively a consultant, providing expertise on use of water and strategy for presenting claims, because the tribe had an interest in the outcome. See id. at
1067-68.
379. 463 U.S. at 144.
380. 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
381. See id. at 612.
382. See id. at 615-16.
383. See id. at 620.
384. See id. The Court did allow the tribes to assert a relatively small fraction of their claims if a title dispute later established tribal ownership of additional irrigable lands. Such a case eventually reached the Supreme Court.
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In rare cases, the Rehnquist Court has resurrected foundational Indian law principles to uphold Indian rights. It seems
to have done so primarily in order to add gravity to outcomes
that largely comported with reliance interests of non-Indians.
This was true in three of the five cases in which tribal interests
have prevailed in the last ten terms of the Supreme Court. 85
3 86 the
In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
Court recited in detail the history of the Chippewa treaties and
the principles of reserved rights to uphold off-reservation fishing rights in Minnesota. 7 The interpretation and application
of treaty rights in that case emulated the factually similar 1979
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Washington v. Washington
State Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Ass'n"'8 Moreover,
the Minnesota decision was nearly identical to lower court decisions that were being implemented successfully after contentious tribal-state litigation by other bands of the Chippewa
Tribe in neighboring Wisconsin," 9 and followed decisions regarding Indian treaties in Michigan litigation. 9 0 A reversal by
the Supreme Court would have created an anomaly and disregarded the agonized history of Indian-white relations in the region that had finally produced a working relationship through
a negotiated arrangement that assumed the correctness ofjudireached during eighteen years of litigacial 3interpretations
91
tion.
See Arizona v. California, 120 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2000) (allowing Quechan
Tribe to present claims to irrigable acreage where the United States had occupied reservation land for a canal to serve others and denied tribal title; the
United States admitted error after adjudication of water rights).
385. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123
(1993) (upholding tribal sovereign immunity, quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832), for the rule that within Indian territorial
boundaries, Indian 'authority is exclusive'"); see also Minnesota v. Mile Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202-03, 208 (1999) (upholding treaty
rights, invoking canons of construction); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc. 523
U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (upholding tribal sovereign immunity). The other cases
in which tribes prevailed are Arizona v. California,120 S.Ct. 2304 (2000), and
Idaho v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2135 (2001).
386. 526 U.S. 172.
387. See id. at 175-85.
388. 443 U.S. 658, 662 (1979) (dealing with the treaty fishing rights in
Washington).
389. See Lac Courte Orielles Band v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
390. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich.
1979).
391. Another view is that the decision in Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians to uphold Indian treaty rights was produced by balancing state and
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As all these cases illustrate, Indian rights can be misunderstood as outside the mainstream by judges unschooled in
Indian law. If the Supreme Court sees tribes as a racial group
pressing for special rights, rather than as sovereign entities
vindicating a political relationship grounded in the Constitution, they will be at a severe disadvantage. Indeed, the potential coincidence of the three dominant attitudes in the
Rehnquist Court's decisions almost invariably produces results
that disfavor legal protection for tribal sovereignty and cultural
integrity and that eschew limits on state power in Indian country. Justices who, in other settings, might adhere to stare decisis, but who find the precedent in this area to be odd, are
tempted to disregard authority and break new ground. The
concept of legally separating Indian people from the rest of society is difficult in the abstract and may be more so in a fact
situation notorious enough to bring the dispute all the way to
the Supreme Court. Justices, who otherwise would rely on coordinate branches to solve the problem, are inclined to wade in
and set things right. Even Justices who see the Court as playing an important counter-majoritarian role-and who attribute
importance to the Court's role in protecting minority rights in a
system where majorities rule-may resist the idea of tribal
autonomy. They may not appreciate that the cultural and political survival of tribes is at the mercy of a homogenizing majority. Only if Indian law is kept in the context of an American
legal tradition, supported by the Constitution and reflected in
solemn bargains secured by treaties, can it transcend the categories typical of mainstream adjudication.
IX. THE NEED TO REDISCOVER INDIAN LAW
The Supreme Court's failure to appreciate that Indian law
is sui generis denies deep traditions that preceded the nation's
founding, were memorialized in the Constitution, and have
been perpetuated by the judiciary until recently. The cornerstones of Indian law-that tribes have sovereignty over their
territory, that state powers are severely limited in Indian country, and that these principles may be changed only by Congress-are essential to our political structure. Earlier Supreme
tribal interests. See The Supreme Court, 1998 Term, Leading Cases, 113
HARv. L. REV. 200, 397-99 (1999). If so, the approach, if not the result, is inconsistent with an analysis using Indian law foundational principles. See generally Getches, supra note 2, at 1626-30 (arguing that the Court's interestbalancing test is, at best, misguided).
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Courts have characterized the relationship of tribes to the
United States as unique. 92 Departing from basic approaches
and rules may seem compelling under the facts of a particular
case, but in Indian law, pulling on a single thread can unravel
the entire fabric. Indian law is not, as some might see it, a collage of incoherent rules; the incoherence in the field today is
largely the product of the decisions of the Rehnquist Court. 93
The field has always been complex and curious in many respects and has not produced results that entirely pleased any
one set of interests. Furthermore it carried the stigma of its colonial roots, but it has served to referee with predictability, if
not perfect justice, the intense jurisdictional battles among federal, state, and tribal interests.
Leaving Indian legal rights and the powers of Indian tribes
to the mercies of the American political system has its risks.9 4
Felix Cohen poignantly addressed the potentially dramatic impact of imposing law and policy on Indians:
[Tihe Indian plays much the same role in our American society that
the Jews played in Germany. Like the miner's canary, the Indian
marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of
other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith. 395

The tragedy of the Indian as miner's canary has been rehearsed several times in our history. Indian policies made by
the political branches were sometimes extensions of national
policies that were deemed "right" for the dominant society.
This tested the practical limits of otherwise acceptable policy
and often caused tragic consequences for Indians. Time and
again, when policies that captured the nation's collective
392. E.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 851 (1985) ("Indian tribes occupy a unique status under our law.");
Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (stating that
the canons of construction of Indian law "are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians"); Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 575-76 (1983) ("Indians have historically enjoyed
a unique relationship with the federal government. .. ."); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831) ("[Tlhe relation of the Indians to the United
States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere
else.").
393. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
394. The risk may be multiplied if courts are uncritical of the purposes and
intended limits of legislation. Cf Vine Deloria, Jr., The Wisdom of Congress
and Other Folklore, 23 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 261, 261-62 (1998) (arguing that
deference to congressional wisdom is unjustified).

395. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53: A Case Study
in Bureaucracy,62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
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imagination were pressed beyond the mainstream of society,
they have had disastrous effects on Indians.
One example was Congress's extrapolation of the country's
1880s public land policy to Indian affairs. The Jeffersonian
ideal of the yeoman farmer that inspired experiments in homesteading was forced on tribes in the well-intentioned but illfated "allotment" policy. It was designed to carve up reservations and give individual Indians allotments in tribal lands,
with the "surplus" lands going to non-Indian farmers. Reservations were broken up into family farms with horrific consequences: poverty, loss of land, and destruction of tribal governments. 96 Congress recognized its mistake and repudiated
the allotment policy, but not before Indians had sacrificed
ninety million acres, tribal governments had failed, and reservations had been wracked by poverty and dismal social conditions.3 97
"Termination" was another policy that foisted on Indian
country ideals that seemed desirable for the dominant society.
In the 1950s, some supporters of the policy thought they were
promoting racial equality. Others wanted to eliminate communally governed groups. 8' The post-war zeal for unifying the
nation combined with otherwise divergent political strains to
find consensus in the idea of terminating the special status of
Indian tribes and bringing them into the mainstream of society.
Congress perfunctorily embraced the policy with little reflection and virtually no Indian participation. 9 The termination
policy destroyed several tribes and drove their members into
severe social and economic distress before it was rejected.40 0
396. See Delos Sacket Otis, History of the Allotment Policy, Readjustment of
IndianAffairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 428-85 (1934); see also The Purposes and
Operation of the Wheeler-Howard Indian Rights Bill, Readjustment of Indian
Affairs: Hearingson H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on IndianAffairs, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 15-18 (1934) (memorandum by John Collier, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs).
397. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 136-38, 144-45.
398. See Gary Orfield, A Study of the TerminationPolicy (1966), reprinted
in SEN. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., THE
EDUCATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS 674-90 (Comm. Print 1970).
399. Id.
400. Congressional action during the termination era ended federal recognition of 110 tribes and bands in eight states. Michael C. Wach, Terminating
the Indian TerminationPolicy, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1181, 1186 (1983). Termination resulted in the loss of tribal government authority, federal Indian programs, state tax exemptions, the trust relationship with the United States,
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Congress then spent years trying to put the pieces back together by "restoring" terminated tribes.40 '
In eras when Congress was imposing versions of grand national policies on Indians, the Supreme Court's role was to ensure, for better or worse, that neither states nor courts interfered with the essentially political decisions involved in the
field of Indian affairs.0 2 Sweepingly destructive policies like
allotment and termination were enacted with little or no involvement or communication with tribes. Perhaps this is unsurprising, given the awesome prerogatives that the Court historically conceded to the political branches of government
notwithstanding a relative lack of transparency that allowed
untoward results to be hidden from public view. Moreover,
these policies were adopted when tribes lacked the level of political and economic influence that they have gained in recent
years.
Since the days of John Marshall, the Supreme Court has
eschewed a judicial role that adjusted the nation's anomalous
political relationship with Indian tribes, thus leaving the task
to the political branches. In the past, lower courts have occasionally indulged their sympathies for states or settlers, or for
individual Indians or tribes. To the extent that these rulings
departed from the nation's political relationship with tribes, the
Supreme Court has been the super-ego in the system. It has
made decisions that seemed courageous or cowardly, depending
on one's perspective, but which were consistent with foundational principles.40 3 The Court started with the premise that
tribes would maintain their autonomy and control over historical territory, but Congress would be in charge of the relationship.404 This meant that the Court tolerated explicit, sometimes drastic, exercises of congressional power invading tribal

and reservation land. Id. at 1188-90.
401. Termination was rejected, and, fifteen years after it began, President
Nixon declared the new Indian policy to be "self-determination without termination." Id. at 1191. Subsequently, Congress passed the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994), and
promised tribes an increased role in development of Indian policy and administration of federal Indian programs. Id. Virtually all terminated tribes have
been "restored" by congressional action. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 18 n.96 (1995).
402. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
403. Getches, supra note 2, at 1589-93.
404. Id. at 1573-74.
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sovereignty and Indian rights or curbing state governmental
incursions or infringements of Indian rights. It tolerated unequal bargains in which the tribal land base was decimated." 5
It also meant that, unless and until Congress acted deliberately, or the executive exercised authority delegated by Congress, states, local governments, private companies, land speculators, resource developers, and others could not interfere with
Indian rights or self-governing powers. In its historical context, this tradition of deference would seem appealing to all but
the most imperious judge.
Congress appears to have internalized the lesson of history
that toxic limits on broad national policies are often discovered
when they are insinuated into Indian policy. The last two generations of American Indians, under the prevailing selfdetermination policies, have had to cope only with the pockets
of poisonous gas that linger from old federal policies. 0° Since
the termination era ended, congressional activity has been less
headstrong, with anti-Indian politicians indulging in only occasional forays that would curtail tribal authority or rights. 0'
Indian legislative activity has never before been as mindful
of tribal interests as it has during the last thirty-five years.
Indeed, no sooner had the brief termination era ended than
Congress began reversing its actions by restoring terminated
It has also implemented the prevailing selftribes.40 8
determination policy with an impressive body of laws and pro405. See Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings and the
Preservationof Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
425, 433-47 (1998).
406. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
407. For example, Senator Slade Gorton of Washington, a notorious foe of
tribal sovereignty, proposed measures to reduce significantly tribes' governmental immunity. In 1998, he introduced the American Indian Equal Justice
Act, which would have allowed contract and tort claims against a tribe to be
brought in state and federal courts instead of tribal courts. See S. 1691, 105th
Cong. (1998); Congress ConsidersAbolishing Tribal Immunity, THE CONN. L.
TRIB., May 11, 1998; see also H.R. 2107, 105th Cong. § 120 (1997) (attempting
to accomplish the same result). Representative Bill Archer of Texas proposed
to tax all business ventures of Indian tribes at 34%. See H.R. 1554, 105th
Cong. (1997); Official Says Tribal Power Threatened, THE DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 10, 1997, at 26A. These efforts were unsuccessful but could recur.
See Chris Casteel, Senator Withdraws Bill to Limit Indian Tribes' Immunity,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 21, 1998, at 1. But see Faith Bremner, American Indians Voice Opposition to Gorton as InteriorSecretary, GANNETr NEWS SERV.,
Dec. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4410186 (attributing the reelection defeat
of Senator Slade Gorton to tribal political action and contributions).
408. See supra note 401.
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grams strongly supporting the sovereignty of tribes. 40 9
These laws provide for Indian control of education and
health care, 410 tribal regulation of environmental quality on
reservations, 41 ' and the restoration and consolidation of the
tribal land and resource base.4 12 Congress has even tried to roll
back some of the Supreme Court's ventures into policymaking
that were in conflict with tribal political and cultural auton409. E.g., Indian Self-Determination & Education Assistance Act, 25
U.S.C. § 450a-450n (1994) (allowing contracting by tribes to perform services
formerly performed by the BIA); Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b, 450c, 450e, 450f, 450j, 450j-1, 450k-450m-1, 450n (1994)
(strengthening the contracting authority of tribes); Tribal Self-Governance
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a note, 458aa-458hh (1994) (allowing tribes to participate
in a "self-governance" project with funds administered under a program akin
to block grants); see also Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1994) (establishing a comprehensive scheme for adjudication of child custody
cases, giving primacy to tribal courts); Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1994) (strengthening reservation administration of
justice).
410. See Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1613-1682
(1994); Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
1801-1852 (1994); Indian Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Prevention Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2040-2478 (1994); Tribally Controlled School Grants Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2501-2511 (1994); Indian Education Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2651 (1994); Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Protection Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 32013211 (1994); cf. Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906
(1994) (encouraging teaching of indigenous languages).
Legislation has also supported tribal economic development. E.g., Indian Financing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-499, 98 Stat. 1725 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); cf. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994) (establishing a regime for tribal gambling businesses that modified but did not substantially undermine tribal immunity
from state law); see supra text accompanying notes 301-06, 312.
411. Amendments to federal environmental statutes gave tribes the option
of being treated as states for the purpose of carrying out programs on their
reservations. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. § 136u (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1370-1377 (1994); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11, 300h-1 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7474, 7601(d) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (1994); cf Surface Mining
Control Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1300 (1994) (affording special treatment
to Indian lands).
412. See Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211 (1994),
and amendments to deal with fractionated ownership of allotments, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 372, 373-373b (1994). Congress also passed at least ten major land claims
acts, DAvID H. GETCHES, ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 231 (4th ed. 1998), and
sixteen water rights settlement bills since 1982, id. at 849-50. In addition,
tribal control and management of natural resources has been enhanced. See
Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1994); National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120
(1994).
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Although there may be serious challenges to Indian interests by members of Congress, tribes today are part of every legislative debate that affects them and they have a growing influence in national and state politics. They are represented by
experienced and educated leaders and often retain skilled professional lobbyists, consultants, and lawyers. In no small way,
they have been aided by the wealth some tribes have gained
from gambling businesses. 414 The threat of Congress's abuse of
its plenary power in Indian affairs remains, but the prospect of
its being used to destroy tribal rights and powers is more limited than ever because tribes are better equipped to participate
in the political process.
Now it is the Supreme Court that appears intent on fitting
Indians into norms of the dominant society's legal system
rather than waiting for Congress to fill gaps and address issues. Moreover, the judicial gap-filling seems especially intrusive on congressional prerogatives in an era when the winds of
policy from the political branches favor the tribal sovereignty
while the Court rolls back self-governing powers.
The
Rehnquist Court's decisions, meanderings from the settled
principles and approaches embraced by all its predecessors,
have created a judicial atmosphere that threatens economic development efforts as well as the political and cultural survival
of Indian tribes.1 5 It is ironic that, in an era when tribes have
gained sufficient respect and competence to deal effectively in
413. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1994) (amendment affirmed tribal criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, effectively overriding the Supreme
Court decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)); 42 U.S.C. §1996(a)
(1994) (enacted to deal with the effects of the Smith decision on members of
the Native American Church); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994) (attempting to override the Supreme Court's rejection
of the compelling interest test in Employment Division, Departmentof Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)) (for additional information see supra
notes 320-325 and accompanying text); Public Law No. 101-612, 104 Stat.
3209 (1990) (designating as part of a wilderness area the sacred lands denied
protection in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1980), thereby assuring that the challenged road would not be built) (for additional discussion, see supra notes 326-30 and accompanying text).
414. In March 2000, California voters passed Proposition 1A, a measure
supporting tribes' right to conduct reservation gambling. See Flawed Ways to
Make Law, L.A. TIMES, March 9, 2000, at B8 (criticizing tribes' successful use
of media in the Proposition 1A campaign).
415. See, e.g., John Fredericks III, America's First Nations: The Origins,
History and Future of American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POLY 347, 40203 (1999).
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the political arena, the Court should, for the first time in the
nation's history, claim the prerogative
of designing Indian pol4 16
icy instead of deferring to Congress.
The Rehnquist Court has used Indian cases to promote
values important to a majority of the Justices. Some cases may
have been selected because they presented an opportunity to
tackle an issue like state sovereign immunity or limits on the
free exercise of religion and the case just happened to involve
Indians. In others, Justices' values have informed their view of
the merits of cases that, in another era, would be seen as
uniquely Indian law matters.
Putting Indian decisions back on a more predictable
course, one consistent with judicial traditions in the field,
might be somewhat easier than if the Court were dedicated to
pursuing a specific "Indian agenda." By renewing its appreciation of the distinctness of Indian law, the Court could return
the field to a foundational approach. That approach requires
the Court, in the absence of clear legislation limiting the historic status of tribes, to defer to Congress rather than conjure
up its own policy. If the Court appreciated the place of tribes in
the constitutional structure it would force more issues into the
political arena. This would certainly not ensure that tribes will
always "win";4 1 not all the decisions of the Rehnquist Court
that are adverse to tribes are "wrong" in their outcome, though
few employ traditional analysis. Under the plenary power doctrine, tribal rights and powers can be whittled and even eliminated, but only by clear legislative statements and after appropriate debate that weighs the policy change in light of a variety
of potential contexts. In this age of greater sophistication of
416. See Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox,supra note 36, at 480.

417. Justices who fully appreciate the traditions of Indian law in our national history and constitutional structure might vote against Indian interests
in specific cases. For instance, the traditional rule is that tribal powers exist
unless and until Congress clearly abrogates them. Some Justices may find
ambiguities where others find none, and the Court may divide over whether
particular legislation has spoken unambiguously enough to abrogate tribal
powers. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740-45 (1986) (holding
that the Eagle Protection Act, though not specific, abrogated a treaty right to
take eagles by including a provision allowing permits for ceremonial taking);
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 807-09
(1976) (holding that the McCarran Amendment waiving U.S. sovereign immunity and consenting to state court adjudication of federal water rights extended to tribal water rights, although the act was not specific, because legislative history showed the purpose of the act would not be served without
including Indian water rights held in trust for tribes in such adjudications).
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tribal leaders, there will surely be Indian participation in the
debate.
The rediscovery of Indian law requires an understanding of
the basic principles and traditions of Indian law apparently
lacking on the present Court. Short of taking a course in Indian law, the Justices need only appreciate why this is a special
field, like international relations, where the judicial role is appropriately more limited than in others. It is not a field where
the Court should plunge in and decide, on balance, what the relations of tribes and their neighbors "ought to be" 418 by applying
the values it brings to bear on other cases where such balancing and interpretive license may be more fitting. In addition,
rediscovery demands that the Court not yield to the temptation
to use Indian cases as crucibles for forging and testing principles favored by the Court's majorities but that are unspecific as
to Indian law. Returning the Court to thoughtful consideration
of the foundational principles of Indian law would end the current trend that grossly disserves tribes by lumping Indian law
cases with cases involving racial preferences, attacks on state
rights, and aberrations from the mainstream.
The Justices must also understand that their recent decisions have begun to dismantle Indian policy, and that this inevitably will cause confusion among state, local, and tribal governments, heighten tensions among Indians and their nonIndian neighbors, undermine reservation economic development efforts, and frustrate lower federal and state courts.
CONCLUSION
Indian law now is submerged beneath the crosscurrents of
several trends in the Supreme Court. Majorities of the Court
use Indian cases as a crucible to further convictions that justice
should be color-blind, commitments that state interests should
be protected, and beliefs that the values shared by the majority
of Americans should be upheld. When Indian rights and tribal
sovereignty are cast as separatist battles that undermine state
jurisdiction for the sake of smoke shops and gambling enterprises, they are not viewed favorably by this Court. More appropriately, Indian rights should be seen for what they are, and
historically have been: the fulfillment of a political relationship
between the United States and self-governing tribes.
The Rehnquist Court has shown that it does not view tribal
418. See Getches, supra note 2, at 1575.
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sovereignty either in a historical context--as part of the arrangements a superior power made with indigenous sovereigns
to secure peace and access to most of the land on the continent-or as an instrument to achieve current Indian policy
goals of economic and political independence set by Congress.
Both conceptions are relevant. The historical context underscores the essentially political character of the relationship and
the policy framework gives meaning to the current nature of
that relationship. If the Court, or at least an intellectual leader
among the Justices, can assume the hard work of understanding Indian law, its historical roots, and its importance as a distinct field, then cases involving tribal sovereignty and existence
could be considered apart from attitudes that orient the Court's
work in most other fields. Whether the trends in other fields
are beneficial or detrimental is for others to evaluate, but even
the most salutary idea for the dominant society, when advanced with the best of intentions over Indian tribes, may
prove to be poison gas.
Just as in the case of congressional policymaking, the
Court's extension of principles considered appropriate for deciding cases affecting other institutions in our society risks failure
as Indian policy. Given the insulation of the judiciary from the
political process and the case-by-case nature of its mission, it is
especially problematic when the Court assumes that its values
are so pervasive and unexceptionable that they should be extended to fill gaps in Indian law and to recast Indian policy
rather than deferring to Congress and democratic processes.
Congress has vacillated and still struggles with Indian policy,
even in this day of educated tribal leaders and wider consultation with and input from affected Indian constituencies. For
over thirty years now, however, Congress has pursued a policy
of tribal self-determination, seeking wide public and Indian input before it legislates.
Unless and until Indian law is again understood by the
Court to be a distinct field, with its own doctrines and traditions rooted in the nation's history and Constitution, it is likely
that Indian policy will unravel further. In the process, Indian
interests will suffer, and the tribes' non-Indian neighbors and
others who would otherwise deal with Indians will become
mired in greater confusion about the applicable law. This will
be the inevitable result of unconscious, ad hoc judicial policymaking driven by a desire to vindicate values that may be inappropriate to Indian law and policy. The situation can be
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remedied by a rediscovery of Indian law. Failing this, Congress
will have to legislate to reaffirm explicitly the principles of
tribal sovereignty that were always implicit in its silence.

